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This paper looks at the real motivations behind the Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) regime through the prism of American corporate activities in Saudi Arabia. The 
author finds that several companies generally hailed as leading the way in corporate 
social responsibility, such as Starbucks, McDonalds and the Hilton Corporation, are in 
effect perpetuating shocking abuses of human rights—specifically women’s rights—for 
the sake of maximizing profits. Such behavior suggests that, for many companies, the 
CSR regime is not motivated by a wider normative shift towards more socially 
responsible behavior, as many authors have suggested, but rather is simply a tool to 
maximize a corporation’s monetary value by appealing to niche markets. The author 
suggests that to end this troubling dynamic, the political and judicial branches of 
government should learn from the harsh lessons gained during the South African 
Apartheid and step forward to prohibit domestic companies from engaging in gross 
patterns of gender discrimination abroad. 
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Globalization has brought about foundational transformations to the international 
system. Today, non-state actors operate increasingly alongside–as opposed to beneath–
states in governing the globe. Within this structure, multinational corporations (MNCs) 
are particularly important because of their enormous economic power and because 
globalization itself is seen as a “business driven phenomenon.”1 The largest MNCs are 
now several times richer than most states and–given their transnational character–are no 
longer subject to the rules and regulations of their home governments. This phenomenon 
has led some to argue that “corporations now govern society, perhaps more than 
governments themselves do.”2 
The ‘retreat of the state’,3 as Susan Strange called it, led to the birth of the 
corporate social responsibility4 (CSR) movement and increased the pressure on MNCs to 
                                                 
1 EGBERT G. CH. WESSELINK ET AL., MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
16 (2d ed. 2000). 
2 JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 
25 (2004).  
3 SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD 
ECONOMY (1996) 
4 In this context, CSR is defined as the notion that “maximising shareholder value is not, 
in itself, an adequate measure of a firm’s responsibilities, and that firms should move 
beyond the focus on shareholders to consider the impact of their activities on 
stakeholders.” Paul Alexander Haslam, Is Corporate Social Responsibility a 
Constructivist Regime? Evidence From Latin America, 21 (2) GLOBAL SOC’Y  269, 271 
(2007). Stakeholders are defined as “any individual or group likely to be affected either 
positively or negatively, in the short or long term, by corporate activities, policies or 
decisions.” Wesley Cragg, Prosperity and Business Ethics—The Case for Corporate 
Social Responsibility in the Americas, Focal Policy Papers, CANADIAN FOUND. FOR THE 
AMERICAS 6 (2001). 
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behave as socially responsible actors.5 In fact, commentators now doubt “whether a 
human rights system premised on state responsibility to respect human rights can be 
effective in a globalized world.”6  
Corporate social responsibility is considered most vital in areas where 
“governments are either unable or unwilling” to enforce human rights and environmental 
standards.7 In other words, corporations operating in a globalized system are seen as 
responsible for regulating the negative impacts of their activities since states are no 
longer able to do so alone.8 Today, MNCs are not only expected to refrain from causing 
harm in the international arena, but are even expected to fill the governance gaps created 
by globalization and contribute to the well being of others.9 In the words of Joel Bakan, 
“Corporations are now often expected to deliver the good, not just the goods; to pursue 
values, not just value; and to help make the world a better place.”10 
Accordingly, NGOs and other human rights activists have engaged in a number of 
campaigns to pressure firms to act as socially responsible actors.11 These groups promote 
a form of moral protectionism and encourage consumers to boycott the goods and 
                                                 
5 See RODNEY B. HALL & THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER, The Emergence of Private Authority in 
the International System, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE (2002).  
6 Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. 
L. REV. 273, 281-82 (2002). 
7 Andreas Georg Scherer, Guidio Palazzo, & Dorothée Baumann, Global Rules and 
Private Actors: Toward a New Role of the Transnational Corporation in Global 
Governance, 16 (4) BUS. ETHICS Q. 505, 507 (2006).  
8 See, Dirk Matten and Andrew Crane, Corporate Citizenship: Toward and Extended 
Theoretical Conceptualization, 30 (1) ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 166 (2005). 
9 Id.  
10 BAKAN, supra note 2, at 31.  
11 See Ethan B. Kapstein, The Corporate Ethics Crusade, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 105 (Sept. 
/Oct. 2001); Morton Winston, NGO Strategies for Promoting Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 71 (2002). 
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services offered by socially irresponsible companies.12 The ‘naming and shaming’ of 
companies has succeeded in putting MNCs on an “ethics crusade” to at least appear to be 
socially responsible.13  
Most companies now pay homage to the notion of CSR. Indeed, the great 
majority of firms now claim that they actively pursue a ‘triple bottom line’ and factor 
ecological and social considerations into their decision-making practices as opposed to 
solely pursuing profit maximization.14 Though MNCs continue to seek profit as their 
primary goal, they suggest that such materialistic concerns do not trump the need to 
“behave responsibly, and to respect, protect, promote and, where they can, fulfill human 
rights.”15  
MNCs now develop comprehensive codes of conduct, have entire divisions 
devoted to CSR, and routinely publish ‘accountability reports’ to demonstrate their strict 
adherence to social and environmental norms.16 Some even suggest that MNCs are now 
on a ‘race to the top’, continuously trying to show themselves as more socially 
responsible than their competitors.17 Thus, one can view “corporate social responsibility 
                                                 
12 Kapstein, supra note 11.  
13 Id.  
14 ANDREW W. SAVITZ & KARL WEBER, THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE: HOW TODAY'S BEST-
RUN COMPANIES ARE ACHIEVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS--
AND HOW YOU CAN TOO (2006). 
15 WESSELINK ET AL., supra note 1, at 17. 
16 The Good Company, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2005, available at 
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_ID=3555212.  
17 See Debora L. Spar, The Spotlight and the Bottom Line: How Multinationals Export 
Human Rights, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 7, 9-10 (1998); Kapstein, supra note 11; see also DAVID 
VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 1-2 (2005) (providing examples of MNCs recent CSR initiatives).  
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[as MNCs’] new creed, a self-conscious corrective to earlier greed-inspired visions of the 
corporation.”18 
 CSR is, however, “by definition, a voluntary commitment.”19 Given the absence 
of binding international law to regulate the vast majority of corporate activities, crucial 
questions arise around the sincerity and the efficacy of voluntary codes of conduct. There 
is, in fact, a “strategic split between [CSR activists] that see themselves as primarily 
working for voluntary CSR and those that favor moving immediately to enforceable 
international legal standards.”20 While some regard CSR as a “‘win-win’, and something 
to celebrate; others view it as a sham, the same old tainted profit motive masquerading as 
altruism.”21 The questions this study seeks to shed light on are: “what does it all amount 
to, really? Is CSR then mostly for show” or is it a manifestation of a deeper normative 
shift within the MNC?22 Moreover, regardless of its true motivations, does CSR provide 
an adequate check on corporate human rights violations or has CSR failed to guarantee 
protection for certain fundamental human rights thereby necessitating more robust 
regulatory mechanisms?  
 This paper looks at the activities of several CSR leaders operating in Saudi Arabia 
and argues that voluntary codes of conduct have failed to ensure adherence to universally 
recognized human rights. Specifically, this paper maintains that, in direct contrast to their 
professed CSR principles, Starbucks, McDonald’s, the Hilton Corp. and Yum! Brands—
all champions of the CSR movement—have perpetrated grave violations of women’s 
                                                 
18 BAKAN, supra note 2, at 28.  
19 Haslam, supra note 4, at  272.  
20 Winston, supra note 11, at 76.  
21 The Good Company, supra note 16.  
22 Id. 
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fundamental rights in Saudi Arabia. These findings raise serious doubts on the efficacy of 
voluntary codes in ensuring good corporate governance. Accordingly, we advocate for a 
series of more robust policies to ensure corporate compliance with international human 
rights principles.  
Part I of this paper outlines the various debates surrounding the value of CSR and 
constructs a theoretical and practical context from which to analyze corporate activities in 
Saudi Arabia. This context includes establishing a baseline of what has been deemed 
acceptable treatment of women according to both international law and voluntary codes 
of conduct. Part II examines the actual activities of the aforementioned firms in Saudi 
Arabia and contrasts that behavior with their CSR codes. Finally, Part III interprets these 
findings within the CSR debate and presents a series of policy prescriptions for how to 





The most prevalent mechanism for promoting good corporate conduct has been to 
encourage firms to adhere to a set of voluntary codes of conduct. Such codes have been 
formulated at both system-wide and individual levels. Global standards such as those 
developed by the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Organization for 
                                                 
23 It should be noted that this divide is not exhaustive. Rather, several CSR scholars and 
activists may fall somewhere in between these two camps. Nevertheless, the value in 
presenting the debate as polarized lies in highlighting the strategies and beliefs that these 
parties emphasize generally. Moreover, both camps agree that exceptions exist to their 
conceptualization of CSR.  
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Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations (UN), and other 
international and non-governmental organizations, as well as company specific codes 
created by the MNCs themselves, form the body of CSR. 
 Not surprisingly, MNCs are the strongest advocates of this self-regulatory 
approach, to which they try to demonstrate their steadfast adherence. “MNCs insist that 
people should have trust in the companies’ statements as to their compliance efforts” and 
have successfully blocked efforts to establish enforceable human rights standards for 
corporate activities abroad.24  Through such mechanisms as lobbying, public relations, 
and corporate giving, increasingly powerful MNCs have generated considerable support 
for self-regulation and, for the most part, have dissuaded lawmakers from enacting more 
stringent and enforceable measures. 
 In fact, several international and non-governmental organizations now believe that 
“voluntary codes of conduct offer perhaps the best” and most effective way to ensure 
corporate respect for human rights.25 The primary purpose of CSR activists adopting this 
approach is to “persuade MNCs to adopt voluntary codes of conduct” and then to 
generate public pressure against those MNCs that fail to act in accordance with those 
                                                 
24 S. Prakash Sethi, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Success of Globalization, 16 (1) 
ETHICS AND INT’L AFF. 89, 96 (2002). 
25 Id. at 103. See also, 100 Best Corporate Citizens 2009, CORP. RESPONSIBILITY 
OFFICER, n.d., http://www.thecro.com/100best09 (describing how their ranking system 
has led to significant changes of the world’s largest MNCs). 
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codes.26 Thus, public scrutiny is believed to constitute an adequate measure against 
corporate abuse.27 
 These groups maintain that, since “the voluntary CSR approach [is] . . . work[ing] 
as an effective means of moving more companies to embrace [human rights],”28 any form 
of regulation would actually “muddy the waters and weaken business support” for social 
issues.29 Thus, “the CSR approach is seen by its boosters as a practical response”30 to 
ensure “minimal necessary standards” for human rights.31 Many of these groups, such as 
the World Economic Forum, are often funded by the MNCs themselves.32 Optimists have 
offered a “ringing endorsement” of CSR codes such as the Global Compact, arguing that 
“[p]rospects are good for the Global Compact [to] . . . translat[e] words into deeds” and 
help promote “peace, stability, economic growth and wealth generation.”33  
 This view has also gained substantial traction among academics who suggest that 
“that the importance of CSR as a set of norms that affects the behavior of [MNCs] should 
not be underestimated.”34 Several constructivist scholars now argue that a veritable 
                                                 
26 Winston, supra note 11, at 76; See also, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 
Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics, 51 (159) INT’L 
SOC. SCI. J. 89 (1999) (discussing accountability politics).  
27 See, e.g., PETER UTTING, REGULATING BUSINESS VIA MULTISTAKEHOLDER INITIATIVES: 
A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 61 (2002) (discussing how multistakeholder initiatives are 
encouraging companies to achieve a ‘triple bottom line’), available at 
http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC11465.htm. 
28 Winston, supra note 11, at 76 (quoting Noam Chomsky).  
29 Maria Livanos Cattaui, Business-UN compact could be at take-off point, 26 July 2000, 
International Chamber of Commerce, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/law/iccbgjj/index.html 
30 Winston, supra note 11, at 75. 
31 Sethi, supra note 24, at 103.  
32B. S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 
15 (1) EUR. J. INT’L L., 1, note 4 (2004).  
33 Cattaui, supra note 29. 
34 Haslam, supra note 4, at 270. 
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transnational private authority regime is forming around CSR codes and is regulating 
corporate conduct.35 This camp maintains that the ‘why’ for businesses is as much about 
the “social license to operate” and maintaining a sustainable business model that factors 
in human rights as it is about short-term profit maximization.36 Harvard professor Ira 
Jackson coined this normative shift “capitalism with a conscience.”37  
 According to this paradigm, CSR is a “set of principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures” that successfully regulate corporate conduct.38 Although 
corporations may initially agree to implement these voluntary principles for the sake of 
attracting funds from socially responsible investors, they eventually come to adhere to 
CSR codes out of a genuine sense of responsibility.39 March and Olson have coined this 
outcome the “logic of appropriateness,”40 which Bernstein and Cashore maintain stands 
“[i]n contrast to a utilitarian logic of consequences.”41 Thus, CSR norms can be seen as 
“an intervening variable, as Stephen Krasner put it, between fundamentals (the profit 
                                                 
35 According to Clair Cutler, a private transnational authority regime is the most 
advanced form of private authority and is defined as “an integrated complex of formal 
and informal institutions that is a source of governance for an economic issue area as a 
whole.” CUTLER ET AL., PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 13 (1999). 
36 Haslam, supra note 4, at 269-296 (2007). 
37 IRA JACKSON & JANE NELSON, PROFITS WITH PRINCIPLES: SEVEN STRATEGIES FOR 
DELIVERING VALUES WITH VALUE (2004). 
38 David A. Detomasi, International Regimes: The Case of Western Corporate 
Governance, 8 INT’L STUD. REV. 225, 231 (2006). This definition borrows the language 
from Stephen Krasner’s definition of a transnational regime. See, Stephen D. Krasner, 
Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 (2) 
INT’L ORG. 325 (1982).     
39 Detomasi, supra note 38, at 231.  
40 James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International 
Political Orders, 52 INT’L ORG. 943 (1998). 
41 Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Can Non-State Global Governance be 
Legitimate? An Analytical Framework, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 347, 355 (2007). It is 
important to note that although Bernstein and Cashore help conceptualize the notion of a 
“logic of appropriateness” they maintain that such an outcome has yet to be achieved.  
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motive) and outcomes (socially responsible behavior).”42  
Similarly, Matten and Crane suggest that CSR is far more than mere “strategic 
philanthropy” meant to increase profits by adding to a firms social and reputational 
capital.43 Rather, they see CSR as an external manifestation of a preexisting internal 
reality whereby firms operating in areas devoid of government regulation take it upon 
themselves to provide for fundamental human rights.44 According to this view, MNCs 
become agents of upholding and enforcing the citizenship rights of those within their 
spheres of influence.45 Thus, corporations that have undergone this normative shift will 
behave as socially responsible actors even in the absence of external pressure to regulate 
their activities.46  
 
The Cynics  
The claim that CSR codes suffice to ensure MNC compliance with international 
human rights principles has been met with considerable skepticism.  The CSR cynics 
maintain that, “MNCs’ pledges toward reforms through code adoption are more rhetorical 
than substantive,” and that corporations’ insistence that the public trust their compliance 
efforts are “hollow claims.”47 Joel Bakan, for example, a fervent critic of CSR, suggests 
that the corporation is a “pathological institution” that “pursue[s], relentlessly and 
without exception, its own self-interest regardless of the often harmful consequences it 
                                                 
42 Haslam, supra note 4, at 270. 
43 Matten & Crane, supra note 8, at 166-168. 
44 Id. at 166- 179.  
45 Id. at 169-173.   
46 See, Id. at 166- 179; Haslam, supra note 4, at 269-296.  
47 Sethi, supra note 24, at 93, 96.  
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might cause to others.”48  Thus, the very notion of a ‘triple bottom line’ is a “dubious 
proposition under the best of circumstances.”49  
CSR cynics “accuse firms of merely paying lip-service to the idea of good 
corporate citizenship” and suggest that ‘optimists’ have “been conned . . . [by] a public 
relations excersize[] designed to give the impression that [M]NCs are concerned about 
social issues.”50 Although even the staunchest CSR critic must agree that many 
corporations often engage in socially responsible practices, this camp suggests that CSR 
is used solely as a profit maximizing strategy. According to financier George Soros, for 
example, “corporate social responsibility [is] being used as a cover for business-as-usual 
practices by companies.”51 Soros maintains that companies “pretend to be interested in 
corporate social responsibility” to desensitize critics and to evade government regulation, 
but that “if there is a conflict between making money and social responsibility, then 
making money tends to dominate.”52 The only important consideration for businesses, 
therefore, is “what are the earnings this quarter?”53 Thus, companies continue to pursue a 
single bottom-line—profit.  
 Whereas the optimistic camp sees global civil society as the force behind CSR, 
cynics suggest that it is the corporation that strategically uses CSR to pull the public 
along by turning potential veto players into stakeholders. This form of “corporate 
                                                 
48 BAKAN, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
49 The Good Company, supra note 16. 
50 Id. 





propaganda”54 is “at best a gloss on capitalism, not the deep systemic reform that its 
champions” claim.55  Thus, cynics reject the very notion of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
and suggest that companies are guided solely by a ‘logic of consequences’. Accordingly, 
this view maintains that “CSR enthusiasts are bound to be disappointed” since “the 
human face that CSR applies to capitalism goes on each morning, gets increasingly 
smeared by day and washes off by night.”56  
 Cynics point to MNCs such as Enron, previously paraded as a “paragon of social 
responsibility and corporate philanthropy” that pledged to “put human rights, the 
environment, health and safety issues” at the core of its business operations, to show “just 
how wide a gap can exist between a company’s cleverly crafted do-gooder image and its 
actual operations.”57 This camp maintains that there are “built-in incentives for 
hypocrisy” within the very notion of CSR, which lead to its failure as an adequate 
mechanism for ensuring responsible governance.58 
    One critique of CSR often levied by the cynics revolves around the notion of 
unenforceability. Corporations that sign global codes drafted by international and non-
governmental organizations do not accept binding obligations upon themselves and are 
free to “choose the degree to which they will abide by their gratuitous promises.”59 Thus, 
MNCs may sign CSR ‘treaties’ “to curry political capital”60 while “postpon[ing] urgently 
                                                 
54 Winston, supra note 11, at 77. 
55 The Good Company, supra note 48. 
56 Id.  
57 BAKAN, supra note 2, at 57-58 (2004). 
58 Webb, supra note 51.   
59 Aaron N. Einhorn, The Evolution and Endpoint of Responsibility: the FCPA, SOX, 
Socialist-Oriented Governments, Gratuitous Promises, and a Novel CSR Code, 35 DENV. 
J.  INT’L L. & POL’Y 509, 539-540 (2007).  
60 Id. 
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needed reforms.”61  Critics are even more weary about MNCs’ company specific codes, 
which they suggest “pose even greater enforcement difficulties” since they “not only are 
self-drafted and self-adoped, but also self enforced, leaving corporations to implement, 
monitor, and enforce them in a perverse concentration of power.”62 These “weak 
protective force[s] . . . offer no basis for legal claims . . . nor do they include any 
complaint procedures or . . . sanctions or remedies in case of non-compliance . . . [which] 
limits their meaning as a vehicle for a human rights policy.”63 
 Another critique of voluntary codes surrounds their degree of specificity. Cynics 
suggest that voluntary codes are “put in vague terms and therefore fail to offer clear 
guidance in specific situations.”64 Moreover, these codes “are presented as public 
statements of lofty intent and purpose,”65 which can lead to an “obfuscation of norms.”66 
Thus, CSR codes are vague enough to enable MNCs to continuously evade criticism by 
citing adherence to one CSR code or another, even when committing egregious human 
rights violations.67  Thus, for example, MNCs may justify corporate complicity in 
governmental abuses of human rights as ‘respecting local customs’ or “abstaining from 
participation in party politics and interference in political matters,” even when doing so 
goes directly against the spirit of CSR.68  
 CSR cynics have responded to these purported shortcomings by actively pushing 
                                                 
61 Sethi, supra note 24, at 98. 
62 Einhorn, supra note 59 at 539-540. 
63 WESSELINK ET AL., supra note 1, at 30. 
64 Id. 
65 Sethi, supra note 24, at 98. 
66 EGBERT G. CH. WESSELINK ET AL., supra note 1, at 58. 
67 Id. 
68 See, JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 26 
(2006) (discussing Shell’s activities with regard to the case of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 
Nigeria).  
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for more stringent regulatory measures. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, 
for example, supported the values espoused by the Global Compact, but refused to 
endorse it citing a “lack of independent verification and enforcement mechanisms.”69 
More vehement critics such as Green Peace, Third World Institute and Corporate Watch, 
“blast[ed] the Global Compact as threatening the mission and integrity of the UN.” These 
activists argue that CSR “allow[s] business entities with poor records to ‘bluewash’ their 
image”70 by claiming to act in accordance with universal norms even when behaving 
irresponsibly. Similarly, Robert Reich argues that since corporations are incapable of 
acting responsibly, the sheer existence of a CSR movement is diverting people’s energy 
and resources away from the more important task of getting governments to regulate 
corporate behavior.71 Accordingly, this camp has stressed “the need to move toward 
legally-binding norms for corporations . . . backed by a range of implementation 
measures.”72  
  
Saudi Arabia: An Ideal Test Case 
To help determine whether firms do in fact adhere to their self-professed CSR 
principles, an ideal test case would take leaders of the CSR movement, place them in an 
environment where the government is either unable or unwilling to regulate fundamental 
human rights, focus on an issue that is devoid of public scrutiny, but whose violation 
                                                 
69 Winston, supra note 11, at 78. For more on the Global Compact see discussion infra 
pp. 32-35.  
70 Id. (quoting Corporate Watch founder Joshua Karliner). 
71 ROBERT REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS, DEMOCRACY, 
AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2007) 
72 Isabella D. Bunn, Global Advocacy for Corporate Accountability: Transatlantic 
Perspectives from the NGO Community, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 1265, 1291 (2004). For a 
fuller discussion of possible enforcement mechanisms see infra Section III.  
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would lead to significant financial gains, and gauge the extent to which these firms’ have 
conformed to their promises to behave as socially responsible actors. The treatment of 
women by US corporations in Saudi Arabia provides precisely such a case.  
As the following sections will establish, Saudi Arabia’s treatment of women falls 
far below the internationally recognized legal standard for human rights.73 Moreover, 
with Saudi Arabia being the largest economy in the Arab world, conforming to its gender 
mores could lead to significant financial gains for US businesses.74 Additionally, the 
treatment of women in Saudi Arabia has not been the subject of a widespread CSR 
campaign—as has been the case with other human rights violations such as the South 
African racial apartheid—thereby lessening the financial costs associated with 
conforming to Saudi practices.75 Finally, Starbucks, McDonalds, the Hilton Corp., and 
Yum! Brands, have all been widely celebrated as CSR leaders and have made numerous, 
explicit promises to respect women’s equal rights even when operating in repressive 
environments.76 Consequently, the Saudi context provides an ideal case study to test 
competing views of CSR.  
 
Women in Saudi Arabia 
The condition of women living in Saudi Arabia is notoriously below the 
international legal standard. Out of the 128 countries surveyed by the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report in 2007, Saudi Arabia ranked last in political 
                                                 
73 See discussion infra pp. 16-21. 
74 Vivian Salama and Arif Sharif, BNP, Citi Exposed to $6.3 Billion Saudi Debt Workout, 
BLOOMBERG PRESS, June 24, 2009, available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601110&sid=aScOQdF6WVI4 
75 See discussion infra n. 113. 
76 See discussion infra pp. 29-41. 
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empowerment, 127th in economic participation and opportunity, and 124th overall.77 
Women in Saudi Arabia have no right to vote, may not drive, must wear full length black 
abayas and head coverings in all public places at all times, are required to attend girls 
only schools and universities, are prohibited from studying certain subjects, are forced to 
eat in special ‘family’ sections of cafes and restaurants, may not play sports, must sit in 
the back of busses (even when the busses are empty), comprise a mere 5% of the work 
force, must work in segregated offices, have an illiteracy rate double that of men, are not 
allowed to leave their homes without being chaperoned by a male relative, are prohibited 
from conversing with unrelated males, and must get the express permission of a male 
relative before having surgery, traveling, accepting a job, buying a mobile phone, 
accepting a marriage proposal, or going to court (even when accused of murder).78 “Saudi 
                                                 
77 RICARDO HAUSMANN, LAURA D. TYSON, & SAADIA ZAHIDI, WORLD ECONOMIC 
FORUM, THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP REPORT (2007), available at 
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gendergap/report2007.pdf.  
78 See U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: SAUDI ARABIA (2008) available at  
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119126.htm; Recent Case, General Court 
Of Qatif Sentences Gang-Rape Victim To Prison And Lashings For Violating ‘Illegal 
Mingling’, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2254 (2008); Katherine Zoepf, Love on Girls’ Side of the 
Saudi Divide, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/13/world/middleeast/13girls.html?_r=1&hp;  
Driving Ban Stays for Saudi Women, BBC NEWS, June 13, 2005, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4089332.stm; Colbert I. King, The Saudi Sellout, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2002, at A23; Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women: Saudi Arabia, 40th Sess. (Jan.14 –Feb.1 2008) available 
at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/co/CEDAW.C.SAU.CO.2.pdf; 
L. Azuri, Public Debate in Saudi Arabia on Employment Opportunities for Women, 
MIDDLE E. MEDIA RES. INST., No. 300. Nov. 17, 2006, 
http://www.memri.net/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA30006; 
Rebecca Leung, Women Speak Out In Saudi Arabia, CBS NEWS, Mar. 24, 2005, 
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Ctr. for Democracy & Human Rights in Saudi Arabia, Women’s Rights in Saudi Arabia: 
The Issue, 2006, Last modified, October 21, 2008. http://www.cdhr.info/Campaigns/ 
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women continue to resist and struggle against [these] discriminatory policies and laws,” 
but to little avail.79  
 
Women’s Rights: The International Legal Standard 
 The severe human rights violations against women in Saudi Arabia have been 
anathema to the international community. The New York Times recently reported gender 
segregation in Saudi Arabia to be “so extreme that it is difficult to overstate.”80 Others 
maintain the status of women in Saudi Arabia to constitute a veritable “gender apartheid” 
tantamount to the racial apartheid of South Africa or to the Jim Crow era in the U.S.81 
African American Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, Colbert King, highlighted this 
connection opining, “[n]ow substitute ‘African American’ for ‘Saudi Woman’ and ‘white 
male’ for ‘male relative’. Get the picture?”82  
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women–the 
UN’s authoritative body on matters of gender discrimination–concluded that it was 
“concerned” with the Kingdom’s treatment of women. In its final report on Saudi Arabia, 
the Committee noted that Saudi Arabian policies went directly counter to international 
                                                                                                                                                 
WomensRights; Faiza Saleh Ambah, An Olympic Door Opens for Saudi Woman, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 18, 2008 at A06, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ 
content/article/2008/08/17/AR2008081702539_pf.html; Richard Abdy, Closing the Gulf 
Between the Sexes, ETHICAL CORP. Aug. 8, 2005 http://www.ethicalcorp.com/ 
content.asp?ContentID=3822; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human 
Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct? 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 307 
(1994). 
79 Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights, supra note 78, at 389.  
80 Zoepf, supra note 78.  
81 see JOHN M. KLINE, ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 180 (2005); Recent Case, 
General Court of Qatif Sentences Gang-Rape Victim to Prison and Lashings for 
Violating ‘Illegal Mingling’, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2254 (2008); King, The Saudi Sellout, 
supra note 78. (This piece received the Pulitzer Prize for Commentary in 2003). 
82 King, The Saudi Sellout, supra note 78.  
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norms regarding the “principle of equality” and that Saudi Arabia’s “concept of male 
guardianship contributes to the prevalence of a patriarchal ideology with stereotypes and 
the persistence of deeprooted cultural norms, customs and traditions that discriminate 
against women and constitute serious obstacles to their enjoyment of their human 
rights.”83 Moreover, the Committee urged Saudi Arabia to begin abiding by international 
human rights treaties by “abolishing de facto [gender] segregation.”84  
 The most widely accepted of these treaties is the International Bill of Human 
Rights, which is composed of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UNDHR), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).85 
The UNDHR has been ratified by every UN member state, while the latter two 
declarations have been ratified by over 140 nations each.86 The UNDHR “set[s] basic 
minimum international standards for the protection of the rights and freedoms of the 
individual” and is “regarded as forming a foundation of international law.”87 The 
Declaration begins by recognizing the “inherent dignity and . . . the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family” and affirms its “faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and work of the human person and in the equal rights of women.”88 
It goes on to prohibit discrimination and degrading treatment of any kind and entitles 
every person “to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set 
                                                 
83 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 78, at 3; 
84 Id., at 7.  
85 WESSELINK ET AL., supra note 1, at 43. 
86 Id. 
87 UN Global Compact, Overview, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ 
AboutTheGC/index.html 
88 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).  
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forth in th[e] declaration can be fully realized.”89 The ICCPR and the ICESCR reiterate 
the UNDHR’s commitment to everyone’s “civil and political rights, as well as [their] 
economic, social and cultural rights . . . without distinction of any kind as to race, colour, 
[or] sex”90 and prohibit “discrimination of any kind . . . ensur[ing] the equal right of men 
and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights.”91  
 The core human rights treaty targeting gender discrimination specifically is the 
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), which has been ratified by over 185 nations. Saudi Arabia ratified CEDAW 
in 2000 thereby officially binding itself to the Convention’s provisions.92 Saudi Arabia’s 
policies towards women, however, directly violate its international obligations.  
CEDAW sees itself not as adding new provisions for the protection of women’s 
rights, but rather as framing the fundamental human rights already outlined in the 
UNDHR in a gender specific context.93  CEDAW defines gender ‘discrimination’ as:  
[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex 
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their 
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural, civil or any other field.94 
 
                                                 
89 Id.  
90 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
91 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
92 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, States 
Parties, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm. 
93 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. 
Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, (Dec. 18, 1979). 
94 Id. 
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The treaty “condem[s] discrimination in all its forms” and requires states to “eliminate 
discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise [and] [t]o take all 
appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, 
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women.”95 
The specific rights enumerated in the treaty include the right to work, to vote, to an 
education, to travel, to receive medical treatment, to access the legal system, to marry 
freely, and to have equal protection before the law. The discrepancy between these 
provisions and the legally sanctioned treatment of women in Saudi Arabia is 
undeniable.96  
 
Respecting Local Norms or Violating Universal Human Rights? 
Generally, Saudi officials seek to quell international concerns of its treatment of 
women in terms of cultural relativism and maintain that such critiques are nothing more 
than thinly veneered tools of Western hegemonic predation. When asked to comment on 
international critiques of the Kingdom’s policies, Saudi Minister of the Interior, Prince 
Nayef, lashed out at the “western media” stating that, “governed by our Muslim beliefs, 
we in the Kingdom respect human rights more than any other state or society in the 
world.”97 Similarly, Saudi Labor Minister, Ghazi Al-Qusaibi, defended gender 
discrimination in cultural terms saying,  “[t]he best place for a woman to serve is in her 
                                                 
95 Id.  
96 Compare with discussion supra pp. 16-18. 
97 Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights, supra note 78, at 38-39 (quoting 
Saudi Interior Minister). 
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[own] home,” and that other activities would only “interfere with her work at home with 
her family, or with her eternal duty of raising her children.”98  
There are certainly cultural differences in defining human rights.  Accordingly, 
states are given the freedom to interpret human rights within a “margin of 
appreciation.”99 Following World War II, however, the international community decided 
that some rights were inalienable to all persons and could not be ignored on grounds of 
cultural relativism. As stated in the Vienna Declaration, “The universal nature of . . .  
[human] rights and [fundamental] freedoms is beyond question.”100 Thus, the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ is limited by core international human rights treaties and norms and “does 
not extend to [people’s] non-derogable rights.”101 In fact, most human rights scholars 
suggest this margin must be “small [and] . . . externally verified, for instance by 
committees of independent experts.”102 Accordingly, “these restrictions leave little room 
for the states’ own view.”103 The core human rights declarations espoused by the 
international community, therefore, establish a global baseline of ‘non-derogable’ rights 
for all people—including Saudi Arabian women—which governments may not infringe 
upon and must protect, regardless of culture, tradition, or religious beliefs.  
The abovementioned UN treaties obligate “every individual and every organ of 
society” to respect fundamental human rights. As ‘organs of society’, MNCs are also 
                                                 
98 Azuri, supra note 78 (quoting Saudi Labor Minister).  
99 WESSELINK ET AL., supra note 1, at 43. 
100 World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, ¶ I,1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23. 
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102 Id., at 43-44.  
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expected to respect these rights.104 This notion was institutionalized in the UN Norms on 
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights, which states that “business enterprises have the obligation to 
promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights 
recognized in international as well as national law . . . for the purpose of eliminating 
discrimination based on race, colour, [or] sex.”105 
  Although CSR codes stress compliance with these global norms, they also 
encourage MNCs to adopt policies that reflect proper deference and respect for local 
customs and mores.106 Consequently, “problems arise if the[] requirements [of respecting 
local custom] do not fully concur with international treaties as ratified by the state in 
question.”107 Needless to say, operating a business in Saudi Arabia constitutes a complex 
challenge for firms purporting to uphold universal standards of human rights while trying 
to respect local customs. Although both of these values fall under the umbrella of CSR, 
all of the CSR codes examined for this study express the view that:  
The sovereign right of states to adopt their own laws and policies is 
restricted by international customary and treaty law. When a state does not 
bring its laws or policies into line with its international obligations, when it 
grossly and systematically violates human rights and does not allow 
companies to act in accordance with generally accepted international human 
rights standards, a rigid appeal on the maxim of compliance with national 
laws and policies cannot be upheld. In that case, it is justified to ask 
companies to protest and oppose the state’s laws and policies.108 
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Clearly, it would be preferable for an MNC to respect local customs rather than appear 
culturally insensitive. However, respecting all local customs in an environment that 
systematically violates fundamental human rights is in itself a human rights violation. As 
corporate ethics scholar John Kline argues:  
Showing respect for local culture does not mean adopting a position of 
cultural relativism that rejects the possibility for global norms to override 
local cultural practices if values clash. . . . Not all cultural practices may 
merit respect, even when based on asserted religious beliefs. When in Rome, 
one should not always do as the Romans do. In fact, the old adage might 
even be reversed. When in ancient Rome, one should not engage in certain 
local customs, such as the practice of feeding Christians to the lions.109 
 
This notion lay at the heart of the anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa where 
local custom and laws fully supported the notion of racial segregation despite its being 
directly opposed to internationally recognized human rights standards. MNC’s that 
elected to comply with (and benefit from) racial discrimination in South Africa were 
targeted and vilified for being complicit in apartheid and could not justify their behavior 
by appealing to the maxim of ‘respecting local customs’.110 The same held true with 
regard to those firms that enforced discriminatory, albeit ‘culturally sensitive’, practices 
in the Jim Crow South and Nazi Germany. If such is the case with respect to race and 
religion, there is little moral footing to say that it does not apply to gender as well.  
Additionally, as discussed more fully in Part II of this paper, companies who have 
signed the CSR codes used in this study have promised to resist local pressures to violate 
women’s universal rights and to treat women with the same dignity they treat men, even 
                                                 
109 KLINE, supra note 81, at 182. 
110 See, ROBERT MASIE, LOOSING THE BONDS: THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA IN 
THE APARTHEID YEARS 268 (1997).  
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when operating in repressive environments.111 Accordingly, even if one could argue that 
Saudi Arabia has the sole right to determine how equality principles are to be interpreted 
within its borders (which we think it cannot), we analyze these firms’ behavior based on 
their own pledges to uphold the equal treatment of women everywhere. In light of these 
companies’ own promises, therefore, MNCs cannot consistently take the position that 
discriminatory practices against women are tolerable based on appeals to local custom. 
  
Costs and Benefits of Compliance 
An additional reason for why the Saudi Arabian context provides a valuable case 
study for testing competing views of CSR is the relatively controlled payoff structure it 
provides with respect to compliance versus defection. As mentioned previously, CSR is 
most relevant precisely when states are either unable or unwilling to guarantee 
fundamental human rights.112 When states do enforce such standards, MNC compliance 
with human rights norms cannot be said to be a function of CSR as much as simply 
following the law, which also happens to be inline with international norms. Testing the 
true impact of CSR, therefore, is best achieved through examining situations where the 
government either imposes no sanction for or actively endorses human rights violations. 
Only then can we determine how much of an effect voluntary codes really have on a 
company’s core business practices. Thus, the Saudi regimes’ approbation of gender 
discrimination better enables us to examine the efficacy and sincerity of self-regulation.  
                                                 
111 See discussion infra pp. 29-41 (discussing how MNCs have promised “to ensure that 
cultural differences and customs never become an excuse for denying or abusing” 
women’s rights and that MNCs will “hold themselves to higher standards than local 
contexts may prescribe or tolerate”). 
112 Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, supra note 7, at 505-507. 
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Similarly, the lack of publicity given to the issue of MNCs treatment of women in 
Saudi Arabia allows us to analyze corporate conduct in the absence of significant public 
pressures. Despite very clear statements from both the international community and from 
women’s rights groups asserting that Saudi Arabia’s treatment of women incontestably 
violates universal human rights principles, the ‘CSR movement’ (composed of activists, 
NGOs, scholars and pundits) has not turned gender discrimination in Saudi Arabia into an 
issue of global proportions. This is in sharp contrast with the attention given to other 
corporate practices, such as the South African racial apartheid, use of child labor in 
developing countries, treatment of migrant workers, environmental degradation or 
substandard working conditions.113  
                                                 
113 Several explanations have been offered for why the systematic discrimination of 
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Whereas in these cases a firm may be abiding by its voluntary code of conduct 
solely for the sake of profit maximization (i.e., to appeal to niche markets and evade 
consumer boycotts), this context enables us to examine whether the normative shift 
outlined by the optimist camp is really occurring. In other words, compliance with a 
policy at the top of the CSR agenda can easily be viewed in terms of ‘branding’ and 
‘marketing’ (as the skeptics suggest). The real question is how true companies will 
remain to their CSR principles and commit to pursuing a ‘triple bottom line’ in the 
absence of public awareness? 
 
CSR Leaders 
Finally, this case study looks at the actions of companies that are widely heralded 
as leaders of the CSR movement. Starbucks, McDonald’s, The Hilton Corp. and Yum! 
Brands, continuously emphasize their sincere commitment to upholding human rights and 
have all been ranked at the top of numerous CSR rankings for socially responsible 
                                                                                                                                                 
Arabia”) (It is important to mention that Lantos wrote this article while he was the 
ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee). 
 A third possible explanation relates to the fact that groups opposing Saudi policies 
have been severely restricted in their ability to mobilize against gender discrimination. 
Keck and Sikkink explain how one of the primary mechanisms through which issues get 
placed on the global CSR agenda is through what they term the “boomerang effect.” 
According to this view, in order to gain political ‘traction’ internationally, an issue must 
first be raised in the home state. It then gets picked up by social activists operating abroad 
who respond by putting their own pressure on the home government. Margaret E. Keck 
and Kathryn Sikkink, supra note 26, at 89-101. “Because of the high level of repression 
and the intolerance of dissent in Saudi Arabia,” however, “independent human rights 
organizations have been unable to function inside the country.” Saudi nationals who do 
attempt to criticize the Kingdom’s policies are punishable under Article 12 of the Basic 
Law. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, A ‘Benign’ Apartheid, supra at 365. In fact, calls by scholars 
and activists to improve the status of women are routinely responded to with arrests and 
McCarthy style blacklisting. See id.; Rebecca Leung, Women Speak Out In Saudi Arabia, 
CBS NEWS, Mar. 24, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/23/60minutes/ 
main682565.shtml 
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companies.114 Although looking at the actions of just a few companies on the sole 
indicator of gender discrimination in one country may not suffice to arrive at 
determinative conclusions regarding the role of CSR on a firm’s business practices, we 
can achieve greater explanatory power through analyzing firms that are considered ‘CSR 
stars’.115 If these companies have failed to adhere to their voluntary codes of conduct, we 
can assume that many companies who have not been celebrated as socially responsible 
also fail to uphold CSR standards.  
In sum, this paper takes leaders of the CSR movement, places them in a nation 
that has failed to regulate a fundamental human right, focuses on an issue that has not 
generated a significant amount of publicity, and analyzes whether the MNCs have 
adhered to their voluntary codes of conduct. The following section begins by outlining 
the most relevant voluntary codes and contrasts these corporations’ promises to uphold 




We now examine what some of the most prevalent CSR codes say about adhering 
to the international norms outlined above. Since defining a precise standard for what 
constitutes CSR is often an illusive task subject to much interpretation, we first establish 
a benchmark for minimum acceptable CSR standards based on the most authoritative 
                                                 
114 See discussion infra, pp. 37-41. 
115 Paul Haslam suggests that social scientists can arrive at powerful conclusions even 
when utilizing small and narrow samples. By looking at ‘hard cases’, which he defines as 
those where one would expect a given hypothesis to not hold true, one can reasonably 
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CSR codes. We establish this threshold by looking for points of convergence among the 
most widely accepted codes and these companies’ own voluntary standards.  
 
CSR: Global Codes 
 
We will begin by looking at the CSR codes espoused by the ILO, the OECD, the 
United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), the Calvert Women’s Principles (CWP), and 
the Global Sullivan Principles (GSP). All of the companies selected for this study have 
signed on to one or more of the codes created by these institutions. The ILO, OECD and 
UNGC are considered some of the most authoritative bodies for delineating acceptable 
corporate conduct and express the criteria by which CSR is very often measured. Thus, 
MNCs are considered to be socially responsible based on adherence to the standards 
outlined by these institutions. The CWP and the GSP focus on women’s rights and 
discrimination respectively and are therefore tailored to deal with the particular issues 
presented in our case study. Although each of these codes possesses distinctive 
characteristics, all of them converge when discussing women’s rights and prohibiting 
discrimination. In fact, the prohibition against gender discrimination is considered to be 




The ILO has a number of codes urging for the protection of women’s rights. The 
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Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy states that MNCs can make “important contribution[s] to the promotion of . . . 
social welfare . . . and to the enjoyment of basic human rights.”117 Although the 
Declaration states that MNCs must “respect the sovereign rights of States, obey the 
national laws and regulations, [and] give due consideration to local practices,” the code 
stresses that MNCs fundamental priority is to “respect relevant international 
standards.”118 When a given state fails to “pursue policies designed to promote equality 
of opportunity and treatment in employment, with a view to eliminating any 
discrimination based on race, colour, [or] sex”119 and “require[s] or encourage[s] 
multinational enterprises to discriminate,”120 MNCs “should be guided by th[e] general 
principle[s]”121 of international norms and should “respect the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the corresponding International Covenants adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations.”122 Thus, MNCs’ international obligations trump 
respect for local custom when those norms conflict.  
Similarly, the ILO Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation, which Saudi Arabia ratified in 1978, states that “all human 
beings, irrespective or race, creed or sex, have the right to . . . conditions of freedom and 
dignity [and] . . . that discrimination constitutes a violation of the rights enunciated by the 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”123 The Convention defines discrimination as 
“any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis race, colour, [or] sex.”124   
Finally, the ILO Action Plan for Gender Equality “promotes gender equality—not only as 
a basic human right—but also as an essential condition for achieving social and economic 





The OECD claims its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to be the “most 
comprehensive instrument in existence today for corporate responsibility multilaterally 
agreed by governments.”126 The Guidelines reiterate the notion that “enterprises should  
. . . respect the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent with their host 
governments international obligations and commitments” and states that “the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights obligations of the government 
concerned are of particular relevance in this regard.”127 Thus, even though respect for 
national policies is important, companies facing “conflicting requirements” must “[h]ave 
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regard to relevant principles of international law” as the baseline for acceptable 
behavior.128 Like the ILO, the OECD urges MNCs to “not discriminate,” which it defines 
as “any distinction, exclusion or preference129 . . . on such grounds as race, colour, [or] 
sex.”130 In fact, the OECD calls “promot[ing] equal opportunities for women and men” 
and “prevent[ing] discrimination” an MNCs “fundamental” obligation.131 The OECD not 
only encourages MNCs to refrain from violating human rights, but rather “encourage[s] 
the positive contribution which multinational enterprises can make to economic, social 
and environmental progress, and minimize and resolve difficulties which may arise by 
their operations.”132 Thus, socially responsible MNCs are expected to take a proactive, 
rather than reactive, approach to “resolve” human rights violations that may emerge from 




With over 5100 participating MNCs and stakeholders representing over 130 
countries, the UN Global Compact “stands as the largest corporate citizenship and 
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sustainability initiative in the world.”134 The Compact has placed corporate “support and 
respect [for] the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights within their sphere 
of influence” at the top of its agenda and seeks to “make sure that [MNCs] are not 
complicit in human rights abuses.”135 The Compact defines ‘sphere of influence’ as 
“includ[ing] the company’s employees, neighbouring communities, business partners 
(including suppliers and contractors), and relevant authorities of the company’s host 
government.”136 Drawing on a report by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), the Compact defines complicity in human rights abuses as instances 
when an MNC “authorizes, tolerates, or knowingly ignores human rights abuses 
committed by an entity associated with it, or if the company knowingly provides practical 
assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of human 
rights abuse.”137  
This definition stresses the notion that: 
[T]he participation of the company need not actually cause the 
abuse; rather, the company’s assistance or encouragement has to be 
to the degree that, without such participation, the abuses most 
probably would not have occurred to the same extent or in the same 
way.138  
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The Compact also distinguishes between different degrees of complicity. “Direct 
Complicity” occurs when a “company actively assists in an abuse of human rights 
committed by others;” “beneficial complicity” refers to instances where a company 
benefits from human rights abuses committed by others; and “silent complicity” 
describes cases where the MNC has failed to “raise the question of systematic or 
continuous human rights violations in interactions with the appropriate authorities. For 
example, inaction or acceptance by companies of systematic discrimination in 
employment law against particular groups on the grounds of ethnicity or gender.”139  
Principle Six of the UNGC deals specifically with “the elimination of 
discrimination,”140 which it defines as “treating people differently or less favourably” 
because of non-merit based characteristics such as “race, colour, [and] sex.”141 The 
Compact’s provisions note that “[m]ost commonly, discrimination is indirect and arises 
where rules or practices have the appearance of neutrality but in fact lead to 
exclusions.”142 The UNGC recommends companies operating in questionable 
environments to take a proactive approach to root out discrimination in all their corporate 
activities as well as “outside the workplace” by “eliminating discrimination, for example 
by encouraging and supporting efforts in the community to build a climate of tolerance 
and equal access.”143 Evaluating the nature of corporate complicity in discrimination 
requires an MNC to “assess the extent to which the host government is oppressive (i.e., 
does it actively endorse the human rights violations) or ineffective (i.e., is it simply 
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incapable of preventing them). The Compact maintains that “[c]ompanies are less likely 
to be found complicit in state breaches of human rights where the breach is a result of 




The Calvert Women’s Principles is the “first global code of conduct focused 
exclusively on empowering, advancing and investing in women worldwide” and is geared 
“directly and specifically to corporate conduct.”145  As in the previous codes, the 
Principles state that although cultural factors play a role in corporate conduct, “care must 
taken to ensure that cultural differences and customs never become an excuse for denying 
or abusing” women’s rights.146 Moreover, the Principles state that when operating in 
problematic states, MNCs should “hold themselves to higher standards than local 
contexts may prescribe or tolerate . . . and should assume a proactive leadership role in 
advancing the rights of women.”147 The code urges MNCs to “promote and strive to 
attain gender equality [and] . . . eliminate gender discrimination . . . based on gender or 
cultural stereotypes” not only in its own practices, but with all its affiliates, vendors, 
suppliers, customers, and other non-employees with which they do business.148 MNCs are 
expected to “work with host governments and communities” with the goal of ensuring 
                                                 
144 Hanks, supra note 136, at 52.  




148 Id. at Art. I.  
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“the right of women to fully participate in civic life”149 and to protect women from a 
“denial of their basic human rights by host governments or other non-governmental, 




The Global Sullivan Principles on Corporate Social Responsibility focuses 
heavily on discrimination. More than twenty years after the adoption of the original 
Sullivan Principles designed to end South African apartheid, UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan and Reverend Leon Sullivan established the Global Sullivan Principles to reiterate 
their commitment to, build upon, and expand the reach of the earlier code to include 
factors such as gender.151 The original Sullivan Principles prohibited segregation “in all 
eating, comfort, and work facilities,” urged “equal and fair employment practices for all,” 
and sought to “eliminate laws and customs that impede social, economic, and political 
justice.”152 The Principles have continued to receive widespread support and endorsement 
internationally.153  
The Global Principles urge MNCs to “support human rights and to encourage 
equal opportunity at all levels of employment, including racial and gender diversity.” As 
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in the aforementioned codes, it advocates for a proactive approach to CSR and supports 
the development and implementation of active “policies, procedures, training and internal 
reporting structures to ensure commitment to these Principles . . . to achieve greater 
tolerance . . . promote equal opportunity . . . with respect to issues such as color, race, 
[and] gender . . . [eradicate] female abuse . . . [and] work with governments and 
communities in which we do business to improve the quality of life.”154  
 
CSR: Company Specific Codes 
 
The codes outlined above provide a general baseline of what the CSR community 
has deemed acceptable corporate behavior towards women rights. As the following 
section shows, the CSR movement has celebrated Starbucks, McDonald’s, the Hilton 
Corp. and Yum! Brands as some of the most socially responsible companies in the world 
based, in large part, on the criteria outlined in these codes. In addition to signing on to the 





Starbucks has been widely hailed as one of the most socially responsible firms in 
the world. It is one of only three companies to have made it on CRO Magazine’s Top 100 
Best Corporate Citizens List for the past ten years consecutively155 and was once again 
placed on the Ethisphere Institute’s 100 Most Ethical Companies List in 2009.156 
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155CORP. RESPONSIBILITY OFFICER, supra note 25.  
156100 most ethical companies, ETHISPHERE INST. (2009), available at 
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Moreover, Starbucks is part of the International Business Leaders Forum (reserved for 
CSR leaders),157 and received the World Business Award for MNCs who have 
contributed to the Millenium Development Goals,158 the third of which is “to promote 
gender equality and the empowerment of women.”159 Starbucks has worn CSR as a 
defining ‘badge’ of its corporate culture and claims CSR to be “at the core of [its] guiding 
principles.”160 Starbucks was an eager signatory to the Global Compact stating that, 
“[j]oining the Global Compact is a natural progression for Starbucks as our own guiding 
principles are already closely aligned with the Global Compact.”161 In fact, Starbucks 
CEO Orin Smith promised that, “Starbucks plans to take an active role in the 
organization by continuing to lead by example.” Similarly, Starbucks was the first MNC 
to sign onto the Calvert Principles stating, “Starbucks enthusiastically supports the 
Calvert Women’s Principles” and promised to “publicly support the principle’s goals” 
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Like Starbucks, McDonald’s has been considered a champion of CSR and was 
placed on Ethisphere’s ‘World’s Most Ethical Companies List’ as well as on CRO 
Magazine’s Top 100 Best Corporate Citizens List for 2009.163 McDonald’s touts itself as 
“a company committed to doing the right thing” and, given its “history of inclusion and 
diversity” promises to place “[g]ender diversity . . . as a priority for the company.”164 
Thus, McDonald’s contends that, “it should go without saying that we support 
fundamental human rights.”165 McDonald’s is a participant in the Global Compact166 and 
has an extensive CSR campaign of its own. The company has formed several internal 
positions and divisions to monitor and manage CSR issues including a “diversity 
champion” to ensure non-discrimination, a Worldwide Corporate Relations Council to 
ensure that core standards are uniform throughout all of its franchises, and a Corporate 
Responsibility Department to train employees in CSR.167  
 
The Hilton Corp. 
 
As a member of the International Business Leaders Forum, the Hilton Corp. has 
promised to promote gender equality and empower women as part of fulfilling the UN 
Millennium Development goals and has also expressed its support for the Global 
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Compact.168 In its CSR report, Hilton Corp. pledges to remain “committed to upholding 
the basic principles of Human Rights . . . consistent with the requirements of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights and maintain the spirit of the International 
Labour Organization core labour standards.”169 Hilton Corp. is also viewed as a CSR 
leader. It was elected a member of the FTSE Good Index Series170 and thoroughly trains 
all its employees in corporate responsibility through the Hilton University CSR training 
program.171 Hilton says that it is “embracing a culture based on diversity” and proudly 
boasts the high ratio of women employees in the “Hilton family.”172 In fact, Forbes 
magazine recently ranked Hilton one of the 50 best workplaces for diversity.173 
 
Yum! Brand 
With nearly 36,000 restaurants in more than 110 countries and over 1.4 million 
employees, the Yum! Brand is the world’s largest restaurant chain.174 Household names 
such as KFC, Taco Bell and Pizza Hut, as well as several others, fall under the umbrella 
of this mega-corporation, which gained a top spot on CRO magazine’s Top 100 Best 
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Corporate Citizen’s List in 2009.175 Despite the economic downturn, Chief Public Affairs 
Officer, Jonathan Blum, said Yum! was “dialing up, not dialing back” its CSR efforts, 
which he described as an essential “part of how we do business.”176 Yum! sees itself as 
“part of the solution to the various aspects of social responsibility”177 and is a charter 
supporter of the Global Sullivan Principles.178 Yum! promises to maintain a 
“discrimination-free” work environment and to not tolerate any form of harassment, 




We now formulate a set of expectations to help us analyze CSR’s impact on 
corporate activities in Saudi Arabia. We base these expectations on the CSR debate, the 
international legal standard for women’s rights, the norm for CSR as expressed in global 
codes of conduct, these companies’ own commitments, and the recognition conferred on 
these firms as socially responsible actors.  
 
H0: The Test Hypothesis: CSR represents a sincere and effective mechanism for ensuring 
corporate compliance with basic human rights principles 
 
If CSR represents a sincere and effective mechanism for ensuring corporate 
compliance with basic human rights principles, then we would expect these companies to 
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adhere to their voluntary codes of conduct despite governmental complicity in human 
rights violations. Since we suggest a normative convergence with universal human rights 
standards, we would expect this to be the case even in the absence of a popularized public 
outcry by the ‘CSR movement’ urging these MNCs to respect women’s rights.  
We use the fundamental principle of gender equality as our indicator for 
responsible corporate behavior. The International Bill of Rights and CEDAW are of 
particular relevance in helping us gauge the standard to which we hold these firms. In 
other words, we inform our conception of ‘human rights’ as outlined in global and 
company specific CSR codes in accordance with what the international community has 
defined such rights to mean. By discrimination we mean: 
Whenever a company policy, practice or procedure specifically 
targets a particular group of people because of a distinguishing 
personal characteristic, and treats that group of people differently than 
the others for the worse. . . . The principles of non-discrimination and 
diversity extend not only to employment benefits, but also to the 
overall atmosphere and environment in the workplace.180  
 
Thus, if the discrimination of women violates “minimum common morality principles for 
a global society, and if those norms take priority over local cultural traditions, even if 
based on interpretations of religious beliefs, then the MN[C]s should not conform with 
discriminatory local practices.”181 
Operating in countries where the government is complicit in human rights abuses 
presents a “complex dilemma” for MNCs.182 We can, however, establish some clear 
guidelines to help analyze a firm’s adherence to CSR. First, “[i]f the company is 
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complying with local legislation that may be seen to be in conflict with human rights 
obligations, do the company’s activities violate the principle of the human right?”183 
Second “[t]hrough its activities and operations, does the company contribute to 
strengthening the role of civil society, or is it strengthening the role of the host 
government?”184 Potential responses to operating in abusive countries can range from 
“seek[ing] an accommodation with local customs without sacrificing core standards . . . 
support[ing] active change in practices where local culture clashes with global values” or 
outright divestment.185 
Based on these criteria, we can distinguish between different degrees of 
culpability for violating human rights obligations.186 Corporate obligations are highest 
when human rights violations are caused by the MNC itself (i.e., within the actual 
operation). At this level, “there is absolutely no excuse for human rights violations” and 
MNCs have “full responsibility for meeting human rights standards.”187 The second level 
is when the human rights violations occur within the MNCs sphere of influence. Here, the 
MNC does not cause the violation, but can use its influence to ameliorate the condition of 
those affected. At this level, socially responsible companies are “expected to do so.”188 
The weakest obligation is when the MNC has no control over and no participation in the 
abuse. Even at the lowest level, the “MNC has the responsibility to create an environment 
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conducive to human rights” since “[a] company can never be seen as condoning a human 
rights violation.”189 
This continuum enables us to distinguish between two forms of CSR: ‘reactive 
CSR’ and ‘proactive CSR’. Reactive CSR refers to companies’ refusal to enforce or be 
actively complicit in human rights violations. Proactive CSR, on the other hand, refers to 
corporate efforts to actively promote human rights standards and to try to ameliorate the 
condition of those within their sphere of influence.  
The four MNCs used in our study are considered to be CSR champions based on 
the criteria outlined in the global CSR codes noted above and have all promised to 
“minimize and resolve”190 human rights violations. Therefore, at a minimum, we would 
expect them to take special precautions to ensure their compliance with universal human 
rights standards and to refrain from direct human rights violations. Moreover, given the 
fact that they operate in an environment where human rights abuses are prevalent, we 
would expect these corporations to take active measures to resolve those violations 
stemming from their activities since, “[i]n the face of strong cultural/religious tensions in 
the external environment, the company may have to take special measures to create an 
environment of trust and inclusion.”191 Thus, these firms will be “part of the solution to 
the various aspects of social responsibility.”192 
Accordingly, the ‘reactive’ measures we would expect in this case are for firms to 
prohibit discrimination from occurring on their premises and to enforce the equal 
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treatment, rights, opportunities, and facilities for men and women. The ‘proactive’ 
measures we would expect these firms to take include favorable hiring practices, gender 
equality education (at a minimum for their employees), philanthropic contributions to 
women’s rights groups in Saudi Arabia, and formal protest when governmental abuse 
occurs within their spheres of influence. In cases where they fail to uphold these rights, 
we would expect them to admit this wrong and promise to improve rather than justify or 
‘bluewash’ their behavior in accordance with another CSR principle (e.g. respect for 
custom).  
In sum, we expect these firms to actively pursue a ‘triple bottom line’. Thus, we 
expect them to maximize profit; however, not at the expense of sacrificing the 
fundamental human right of gender equality. 
 
HA: The Alternative Hypothesis: CSR does not represent a sincere and effective 
mechanism for ensuring corporate compliance with basic human rights principles 
 
 
 The alternative hypothesis makes the directly opposite prediction from our test 
hypothesis. According to the alternative hypothesis, we expect that MNCs will fail to 
adhere to the standards set forth in both global and company-specific CSR codes. These 
companies will not only fall short of their commitments to ameliorate the conditions of 
their surrounding communities, but will actually be complicit in government sanctioned 
human rights abuses. Rather than seeking an accommodation with local customs, actively 
supporting change, or divesting, firms will “adopt local values and practices.”193Thus, far 
                                                 
193 KLINE, supra note 81, at 183. 
 46
from being “part of the solution”194 MNCs will be ‘part of the problem’ and will violate 
both their reactive and proactive CSR obligations.  
We expect only a single bottom-line—profit. Companies will be willing to 
sacrifice human rights standards and will enforce gender discrimination if doing so will 
appeal to ‘niche markets’ in line with the prevailing Saudi customs. Thus, we expect the 
treatment of women by these MNCs to be significantly worse than their treatment of 
men. Moreover, these MNCs will refrain from criticizing governmental human rights 
violations and, if exposed, will seek to justify their abuses in CSR terms. CSR, therefore, 
becomes a profit-maximizing tool in that it enables firms to escape public scrutiny and 
desensitize critics to an MNCs actual activities.  
 
Comparative Analysis: Evidence from Saudi Arabia 
 
In direct contrast to both global and their own voluntary codes of conduct, 
Starbucks, McDonald’s, the Hilton Corp. and Yum! Brands,195 are all complicit in severe 
gender discrimination in Saudi Arabia.196 As mentioned previously, women in Saudi 
Arabia are confined to strictly segregated ‘women only’ zones when in the public 
sphere.197 These ‘socially responsible’ MNCs have “made a number of changes to their 
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business practices in ‘deference’ to Saudi”198 mores and “enforce laws and customs that 
dehumanize women.”199 Essentially, these policies entail segregating women entirely 
from men, providing them with far inferior substitutes, and failing to take any measures 
to ameliorate their dismal condition. Thus, these MNCs have violated both their 
‘reactive’ and ‘proactive’ promises. 
“One of the untold stories” of these MNCs is that they maintain “strictly 
segregated eating zones”200 and have “separate entrances” for women.201 Although these 
firms contend that they “provide [separate but] equal amenities” to both women and men, 
the reality is very different.202 While males are allowed to enter the ‘family’ sections, 
women are constrained to “tiny cubicles with long curtains around them” and are 
prohibited from stepping foot inside the ‘men only’ sector.203 Moreover, while “[t]he 
men’s sections are typically lavish, comfortable and up to Western standards . . . the 
women’s or ‘families’’ sections are often run-down, neglected and, in the case of 
                                                                                                                                                 
requirement does not infringe on women’s rights. See discussion infra pp. 58-59. Thus, 
the argument that operating a business in Saudi Arabia necessitates this kind of treatment 
is erroneous. Dunkin Donuts was not included in this study because we are looking 
specifically at CSR leaders and Dunkin Donuts was absent from all of the most 
prominent ‘responsible companies’ lists we examined.  
198 Manning, supra note 195.  
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Starbucks, have no seats.”204 Additionally, these firms routinely bar entrance to “women 
who show up without their husbands.”205  
A few firsthand accounts of how gender discrimination is practiced by these firms 
should help shed light on the severity of the issue. Washington Post editorialist Margaret 
Lidsey explains how when she first entered a Starbucks in Riyadh, the ‘barista’ 
prohibited her from using the chairs in the men’s section and instructed her to sit in the 
“family section that was one-third the size of the men’s section and had no chairs or 
tables.” When she complained, the employee told her husband (he refused to speak to her 
directly) that, if she wanted a seat, “she could drink [her] coffee while sitting in [her] 
car.”206  
Similarly, writing for the Los Angeles Times, staff writer Megan Stack recalls the 
first time she was ejected from the “men’s only” section of a Saudi Arabian Starbucks 
writing: 
Starbucks had another unmarked door around back that led to a 
smaller espresso bar, and a handful of tables smothered by curtains. 
That was the ‘family’ section. As a woman, that’s where I belonged. I 
had no right to mix with male customers or sit in plain view of passing 
shoppers. Like the segregated South of a bygone United States, today’s 
Saudi Arabia shunts half the population into separate, inferior and 
usually invisible spaces. 
 
Starbucks has refused to acknowledge its enforcement of gender discrimination and has 
sought to justify its behavior by appealing to the corporate value of ‘respecting local 
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custom’. In response to criticisms over its treatment of women, Starbucks issued a release 
stating:  
[Starbucks is] a responsible, respectful and caring corporate citizen. . . 
. We are very sensitive to, and highly respectful of, local religious 
customs, social norms and laws . . . [O]ur position is that we will 
continue to work in the prevailing economic, social and political 
environment as long as we can do so within our business principles 
and values.207 
 
These ‘business principles and values’ recently led an American businesswomen working 
in Saudi Arabia to be “thrown in jail, strip-searched, threatened and forced to sign false 
confessions” for sitting and speaking with a male in a local Starbucks.208 At her trial, the 
judge told her she “would ‘burn in hell’”209 for her crime, which was “travel[ing] alone 
and sit[ing] with a strange man and talk[ing] and laugh[ing] and drink[ing] coffee 
together.”210 
Once again, Starbucks sought to protect its image by appealing to its other 
corporate values.   Starbucks’ only response was that it was “concerned by reports that a 
customer was asked to leave one of our stores and arrested” and that it “takes pride in 
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respecting different cultures.”211 Starbucks’ comment included no formal protest and 
failed to even mention the gender discrimination issue.  
Although the arrest initially “sparked fierce debate within the country,”212 the 
local authorities made sure the matter would not get too much attention and “launched a 
crackdown on the local press” threatening to sue columnists covering the issue. Again 
Starbucks remained silent.213 
 Like Starbucks, McDonald’s has refused to criticize Saudi Arabian policies or 
take steps to ameliorate the treatment of women.214 Also like Starbucks, McDonald’s has 
a policy of segregating women in ‘family zones’ and “evict[ing] . . . unaccompanied (by a 
male) female customers.”215 Multi-franchise owner Sheikh Khalid admitted that profit 
maximization was at the heart of these decisions. Khalid maintains he instituted this 
“scheme” as a result of “extensive feasibility stud[ies] and random surveys of potential 
customers.”216 Once it was concluded that enforcing gender segregation would maximize 
profits (by appealing to “him, him, him and him,” opines Colbert King), Khalid 
implemented the policy.217 
 The McDonald’s corporate headquarters has not only failed to criticize or regulate 
these activities, but has indeed showered an array of awards on its Saudi franchises for 
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“outstanding” performance. Among these fifteen plus accolades, are included awards for 
“Outstanding Operations and People’s Development,” “Outstanding Sales,” “Outstanding 
Restaurant Development,” “Best Sales Accuracy,” “Best Brand Ambassador,” and the 
most coveted McDonald’s award of all, the “Golden Arches Award,” given to only the 
top 1% of stores based on qualitative standards such as customer service.218 The message 
is clear, if segregation pays, do it. 
 The Hilton Corp. has similarly instituted discriminatory practices in its Saudi 
hotels. Rita Jensen, editor in chief for Women’s eNews, describes her stay at the Jeddah 
Hilton and claims she was barred from eating in the “expansive hotel dining area [which] 
was reserved for men” and was “relegated to the smaller ‘family area,’ that was blocked 
from public view.”219 Moreover, Jensen claims she was prohibited from using “the 
hotel’s pool or athletic facilities,” which were both reserved for men only.220 Rather, 
Jensen explains how women who wanted to swim were forced to use the hotel’s ‘private 
beach’, “a half-hour’s drive away” with shuttles leaving only twice daily with “no 
possibility of returning at” one’s convenience since women are prohibited from 
driving.221 Jensen describes the scene at the ‘private beach’ as follows: 
Behind the Barricades: With its solid-steel rusted entrance gate and 
shabby-looking lounge chairs, the beach was like any facility designed 
for the exclusive use of those with lesser status. The faded, stained 
condition of it all caused spiffy visions of the Hilton pool to dance 
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resentfully in my head.222 
No matter how Hilton may try to justify respect for local custom, in this case, separate is 
far from equal.223 
U.S. firms have also been complicit in discriminatory employment practices. As 
mentioned previously, women constitute a mere 5% of the Saudi work force and need a 
male relative’s permission before accepting a job.224 The precise percentage of women 
employed in these American firms is difficult to estimate since “[t]he Saudis do not 
disclose employment practices of the more than 100 U.S. companies operating in Saudi 
Arabia.”225 Moreover, these MNCs themselves refuse to disclose their percentage of 
women employees in Saudi Arabia, preferring instead to demonstrate their commitment 
to ‘diversity’ by publicizing the global average.226 It is important to note, however, that 
these firms do have country-specific websites that publish CSR diversity reports for 
several of the regions in which they operate. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia is one of the few 
countries that is never included on these lists.227 Given this lack of transparency and these 
firms’ fervent respect for ‘local customs’, it would not be far-fetched to suspect that 
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women are employed at rates comparable with the national average. In no instance have 
these firms publicly addressed the dismal representation of women in the Saudi 
workforce. If they were making efforts to improve the employment prospects of women, 
we would likely expect them to publicize such efforts. Moreover, there is no evidence 
that these firms have taken any other form of proactive measures to challenge women’s 
inferior status in the Kingdom. 
In fact, diplomats operating in the region say that most American MNCs in Saudi 
Arabia either “do not employ women” or, when they do, “make them work in offices 
segregated from men, as is the Saudi custom.”228 Often these work places lack a “place 
for the women to sit or go to the toilet.”229 Moreover, upon arriving at the Jeddah Hilton, 
Rita Jensen claims: “I noticed that all the hotel employees I had seen so far--from the 
greeters, bellstaff, security guards, registration clerks, tenders of the breakfast buffet–
were male, a fact that remained true throughout my stay. Not a single female 
employee.”230 
Our findings suggest that Starbucks, McDonald’s, the Hilton Corp. and Yum! 
Brands have been complicit in enforcing severe gender discrimination, despite very clear 
voluntary codes to the contrary. Several American commentators and government 
officials contend that, while the treatment of women by Saudi Arabia is unacceptable by 
the universal standard of human rights, it is the “willing compliance with apartheid on the 
part of U.S. firms [that is] perhaps the most galling.”231 These findings detract from 
assertions that CSR provides an adequate check on corporate behavior and suggest that 
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more robust measures are necessary to ensure corporate compliance with universal 




The activities of Starbucks, McDonald’s, the Hilton Corp., and Yum! Brands, 
strongly support our alternative hypothesis. In the absence of governmental regulation and 
public scrutiny, these corporations have failed to abide by both global CSR standards and 
their own voluntary codes. These firms are not only failing to ameliorate the condition of 
women in Saudi Arabia, but are actively supporting severe gender discrimination through 
their practices. Thus, these firms are guilty of ‘direct complicity’, ‘beneficial complicity’, 
and ‘silent complicity’.232 These findings lead to two conclusions.  
First, they call into question claims of a corporate normative convergence with 
universal human rights principles and lend credence to the notion that a ‘logic of 
consequences’, rather than of ‘appropriateness’, continues to dominate the motivations of 
several firms considered to be leaders of the CSR movement. We do not suggest that CSR 
codes have no value or fail to serve a purpose. Even the staunchest critic of CSR must 
admit that many firms act in accordance with a number of their CSR principles. Moreover, 
many firms engage in a myriad of socially responsible acts and refuse to engage in human 
rights violations. In Saudi Arabia, however, maximizing profits required firms to sacrifice 
their social bottom-line and enforce gender discrimination. In this case, CSR was ignored 
once it was pitted against profits. This demonstrates that, at least in some instances, many 
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firms celebrated for pursuing a ‘triple bottom-line’ will compromise their CSR values to 
maximize their monetary bottom-line. Thus, in the absence of public scrutiny and 
governmental regulation (which might have otherwise changed the ‘payoff structure’ 
associated with respecting CSR codes), even the most socially responsible firms have 
been complicit in violating fundamental human rights.  
Second, our findings show that Saudi women’s non-derogable rights have fallen 
below the CSR radar. Therefore, relying solely on voluntary codes of conduct to regulate 
corporate behavior allows for the possibility that certain human rights abuses will 
continue unchecked. Thus, CSR can be said to leave behind significant gaps in global 
governance. Assuming “the CSR movement has developed in response to governance 
gaps,”233 we suggest that it has yet to fulfill its mission, and should, therefore, be 
supplemented with additional regulatory policies.  
If Starbucks—the crown jewel of the CSR movement234—can engage in severe 
gender discrimination without incurring any form of serious protest from those activists 
charged with keeping it honest, many more firms can be assumed to be falling short of 
their CSR obligations in Saudi Arabia.235 In fact, even though not part of this study, firms 
such as “ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, and Boeing—do not employ any women. Several 
other U.S. companies, including Citibank, Saks Fifth Avenue, Philip Morris and Procter & 
Gamble, have women on their payroll, but they work in offices segregated from men.”236 
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The question then arises, in this context, what role has CSR played for these firms? 
Based on our findings, we suggest that CSR has—as the cynics maintain—served to 
shield these companies from criticism over engaging in and failing to protest gender 
discrimination. MNCs have justified their actions in Saudi Arabia according to the value 
of respecting local custom. Even though all the codes examined in this study urge respect 
for local practices, the same codes also state explicitly that MNCs should prohibit 
discrimination and should not bend to local pressures to the contrary. Despite this fact, 
however, these corporations have been able to choose which code to adhere to on an ad 
hoc basis depending on which value best serves them in a given context. Thus, these codes 
have, as the cynics maintain, “helped companies postpone urgently needed reforms.”237 
These corporations’ appeal to ‘respecting local custom’ as a justification for 
engaging in gender discrimination has worked effectively to silence critics since firms are 
still adhering to a CSR code. This strategy has confounded the efforts of those CSR 
activists whose job it is to reward ‘do-gooders’ and shame wrongdoers, such as the 
Corporate Responsibility Officer, which placed three of the four firms in this study at the 
top of its 100 Best Corporate Citizens List in 2009.238 This has likely helped to prevent the 
anti-discrimination movement from gaining momentum in Saudi Arabia. 
Although MNCs might argue that ‘getting a coffee’, ‘sitting in a seat’, and 
‘swimming in a pool’ are not universal human rights, treating women equally 
                                                                                                                                                 
Morris, and others—to extend gender discrimination to their own hiring practices. . . . 
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incontestably is.239 Thus, regulating these activities in a separate and unequal manner 
solely on the basis of gender violates women’s fundamental rights as human beings. 
These corporate justifications mirror those used by MNCs operating in South 
Africa at the time of Apartheid. There, MNCs also violated basic human rights claiming 
they had “no choice but to defer to the local ‘culture’.”240 The only difference in Saudi 
Arabia is that the victims are women.241  
Moreover, Starbucks’ promise that “while Starbucks adheres to the local custom 
by providing separate entrances, service and seating, all our stores provide equal 
amenities” echoes directly ‘separate but equal’ claims made during the Jim Crow era in 
the United States. First, these claims are simply false because women’s facilities are far 
inferior to those of men. Second, it is well established that separate is “inherently 
unequal.”242 In Brown v. Board, the Supreme Court ruled that “the doctrine of ‘separate 
but equal’ has no place”243 noting that segregation, even when claiming to offer equal 
facilities, is meant to subjugate the marginalized group to their detriment.244 Similarly, the 
first principle articulated in the original Sullivan Principles (discussed below) is a 
company’s obligation to desegregate “all eating, comfort and work facilities,” which is the 
right that the companies in our study have violated most egregiously.245  As in the Jim 
Crow South, segregation in these fora is a fundamental indicator of inequality. By 
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preventing one group of people from enjoying these rights freely, these firms are 
dehumanizing women and are enforcing a prime manifestation of deep-rooted female 
inequality and the perceived superiority of men. Again, it is not the ability to swim in a 
pool or sit in a courtyard per se that is the fundamental value. It is the right to be treated 
equally regardless of gender, race or any other natural characteristic. 
Furthermore, the MNC’s that have elected to engage in gender apartheid cannot 
shield themselves from criticism by arguing that alternatives are not available.  Other 
firms operating in Saudi Arabia have pursued a compromise between accommodating 
local cultural norms and remaining true to their guiding principles. Dunkin Donuts, for 
instance, “has set an example”246 and operates an establishment in Saudi Arabia “where 
men and women can eat at adjoining tables in an open seating area.”247 Thus, Dunkin 
Donuts has refused to place women in curtain-covered cubicles with no chairs and has 
taken active measures to ensure that men and women can sit openly and freely, thereby 
incorporating universal values into its business practices. Surprisingly, even though 
Dunkin Donuts was “the only exception to [women’s] humiliation” among American 
restaurants in Saudi Arabia,248 the CSR community has yet to applaud it for its actions.249  
Additionally, although not a corporation per se, UC Berkeley has found creative 
ways to maintain operations in Saudi Arabia while upholding universal human rights. 
When asked to team with the Saudi government in establishing a new university in the 
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Kingdom, UC Berkeley conditioned its assistance on Saudi respect for women’s rights. 
When criticized for “selling [its] name” and operating in a country that bars women from 
studying certain subjects, Berkeley was quick to reassure critics that the campus would be 
“an island of nondiscrimination” saying, “[w]e are going to have an agreement in which 
any kind of discrimination will be forbidden. This new university will have no 
discrimination at all.”250 
Although such exceptions are rare in Saudi Arabia, they demonstrate that it is 
possible to conduct business legally in the country without committing overt acts of 
gender discrimination.  Therefore, “many of the policies enforced by [Starbucks, 
McDonald’s, the Hilton Corp. and Yum! Brands] are conforming to custom rather than to 
legal mandates.”251 Thus, in some ways, companies that elect to comply with local 
customs that systematically deprive women of their fundamental rights bear an even 
greater culpability than their South African counterparts, where apartheid was legally 
mandated.  
We do not advocate that firms refuse to alter their business practices in deference 
to Saudi customs. Rather, we advocate only that they do so within a “margin of 
appreciation” that retains well-established universal principles as the baseline for 
acceptable behavior.252 These firms could avoid depriving women of equal rights in 
several ways. First, they could adopt policies similar to those of Dunkin Donuts or UC 
Berkeley and allow women to sit freely and openly with equal rights as men. This would 
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be a drastic improvement to placing women in seatless, curtained off sections and calling 
the religious police on those who show up without their husbands. In Hilton’s case, the 
hotel could take special measures to ensure that women have access to the same amenities 
as men. Thus, Hilton could grant women access to its pools and gyms or, at a bare 
minimum, build women their own facilities of equal quality rather than forcing them to 
drive a half-hour out of the city to use a dilapidated beach. 
Second, there is no requirement that these corporations even have seating areas or 
pools. While operating a coffee or burger ‘stand’ rather than having seats, or in Hilton’s 
case not having a pool or gym, may lead to fewer profits, such policies would protect 
these firms from committing human rights abuses. Should Saudi Arabia not allow these 
firms to treat women equally, they could choose to do away entirely with their seating 
areas or pools. This would eliminate the negative psychological impact that Brown v. 
Board suggested was at the root of segregation.253 A woman walking into one of these 
establishments would no longer be treated as inferior to her male counterparts because of 
her gender. Although such measures might have a negative impact on the company’s 
revenues as fewer Saudis may choose to patronize their establishments, this is precisely 
what these firms have promised to do in their CSR codes. As there appears to be no other 
persuasive justification for their failure to comply with their own CSR standards, the 
business practices of these companies in Saudi Arabia lead to the conclusion that, at least 
in some cases, they will sacrifice social responsibility in favor of profit maximization. 
Finally, if voluntary compliance with CSR principles were always effective, one 
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would expect these companies to work proactively to ameliorate women’s condition in the 
work place.   There are no laws prohibiting these firms from making special efforts to hire 
a greater proportion of women, support gender equality education, protest abuses or 
engage in other such practices that we would expect from CSR ‘heroes’ operating in a 
repressive environment. These firms’ failure to do so despite their stated corporate 
commitment to gender equality leaves little doubt that human rights is not an intrinsic 
good for them that will always take precedence over corporate interests. Gender 
discrimination in Saudi Arabia has not (yet) mobilized CSR activists to call for any form 
of consumer or shareholder protectionism. Engaging in such proactive practices, therefore, 
would only lead to greater financial costs with no reputational gains and are consequently 
absent from these MNCs’ agendas. 
In the following Section we offer a series of more robust policy proposals that can 
serve to improve the human rights records of companies operating in Saudi Arabia by 
helping to ensure respect for women’s fundamental human rights. 
 
Policy Prescription 
The current international architecture has allowed for deep governance gaps to 
develop with respect to regulating corporate conduct. This paper demonstrates that 
voluntary codes of conduct, national laws, and international treaties do not ensure that 
MNC’s operating abroad will consistently protect fundamental rights established by 
international standards and incorporated in their internal codes of conduct.  Assuming that 
the United States has an interest in ensuring that U.S. corporations respect people’s 
internationally recognized ‘non-derogable’ rights, it is important to explore what 
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additional measures could further that end. We agree with John Ruggie’s claim that “no 
single silver bullet can resolve the business and human rights challenge.”254 Several 
possible solutions exist that range from ‘softer’, market-driven approaches, to ‘harder’, 
more legally enforceable measures. Accordingly, this paper proposes a series of both 
‘soft’ and ‘hard’ measures that American corporations, the United States government and 
the international community as a whole can implement to promote a better human rights 
record for MNCs operating in Saudi Arabia.255  
 
Monitored CSR 
The unregulated CSR approach has allowed U.S. companies to evade public 
scrutiny even when committing gross human rights abuses. Voluntary compliance with 
CSR relies primarily on the power of public scrutiny, which is believed (correctly) to 
mold firm behavior.  The public and shareholders, however, have paid relatively little 
attention to U.S. companies’ infringement of women’s right in Saudi Arabia. Given the 
lack of attention paid to these firms’ activities in the region and given the importance of 
this issue, purely voluntary standards have failed to achieve their intended purpose.256 We 
argue that, at a minimum U.S. companies operating in areas where human rights 
violations are tolerated or even encouraged, should be required to report to the public and 
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their shareholders any activities that violate their own CSR codes. This would at least 
prevent the type of hypocrisy George Soros suggested lay at the root of CSR.257  
As long as consumers and shareholders remain ignorant about the actual practices 
of MNCs, it will be difficult to engender significant changes in corporate conduct since 
the ‘cost-benefit’ analysis of acting responsibly as opposed to irresponsibly remains 
unchanged. Thus, the first step to ameliorating the corporate human rights record is to 
ensure that consumers and shareholders be well-informed about the practices of those 
from whom they purchase and in whom they invest. Since our findings suggest that firms 
will pursue scrupulously those policies that help build their brand (and in turn enhance 
their financial bottom lines), this policy should help alter the ‘payoff structure’ for 
irresponsible behavior.  
Scholars have termed such market-driven approaches ‘shareholder’ and 
‘consumer’ activism258 and suggest that, “the market can and will respond if it has the 
right information.”259 This is based on the presumption that “like all ordinary people,” 
consumers and shareholders want to “live in a world that is civil”260 and are willing to 
direct their money to corporations that promise to help make it so. In fact, there are scores 
‘socially responsible’ investment firms that oversee a combined total of nearly three 
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trillion dollars in the U.S. alone.261 Moreover, these funds are growing by a rate nearly six 
times that of the market as a whole.262 Thus, by requiring firms to better inform their 
consumers and shareholder, we can improve corporate behavior. 
Since the treatment of women is of paramount importance and is often shielded 
from public attention, the reporting requirement we advance would also include the 
establishment of an objective and independently verifiable rating system based on a 
company’s treatment of women. As noted above, Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, and Greenpeace, among others, refused to endorse the Global Compact precisely 
because of its lack of independent verification and enforcement mechanisms. These NGOs 
feared that such a lack of accountability would enable firms to reap the rewards of 
presenting themselves as socially responsible without any way of verifying their 
promises.263 Nevertheless, certain CSR measures do have the sort of verification and 
enforcement mechanisms advocated for by these groups. The SA8000, for example, is an 
independent auditing standard developed by Social Accountability International (SAI). 
The SA8000 operates under the presumption that “corporations cannot be trusted to self-
monitor their compliance with their own voluntarily adopted ethical codes,” and argues 
that, “corporate social performance needs to be independently audited on a regular basis 
by credible auditors.”264  
We suggest that without some form of independent accountability to ensure 
women’s rights in Saudi Arabia, either by a private body such as SAI, or by the code 
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creators themselves (ILO, OECD, UN, etc.), several firms will be able to escape 
regulation and will refuse to acknowledge their wrongdoing. Although to many this may 
seem like an obvious conclusion, this is precisely what these global CSR codes are relying 
on currently. As Aaron Einhorn suggests, “not only are [CSR codes] self-drafted and self-
adopted, but also self enforced, leaving corporations to implement, monitor, and enforce 
them in a perverse concentration of power.”265 
For example, celebrating Starbucks’ enthusiastic signing of the Calvert Principles, 
Elizabeth Laurienzo, Calvert's director of corporate communications, stated that “Calvert 
is encouraging companies to voluntarily endorse the principles. . . . In the meantime, we 
have been careful to place disclosure and reporting at the heart of the Calvert Women's 
Principles.”266 Starbucks is charged with ‘disclosing’ and ‘reporting’ on its own women’s 
rights abuses and has done neither. The purely voluntary approach, therefore, has failed to 
remedy a fundamental human rights abuse that in this case was the code’s sole purpose. 
Notwithstanding this failure, Starbucks’ enthusiastic signing of the Principles has enabled 
it to develop a closer relationship with its creator, Calvert Investments, which also 
happens to be the largest socially responsible fund in the world.267 Thus, through signing 
the voluntary code Starbucks has been able to gain immense reputational and financial 
capital despite its engaging in severe gender discrimination. 
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Auditing and certification systems for ensuring corporate compliance are nothing 
new.268 In fact, “environmental auditing has grown rapidly and is now commonplace.”269 
Unfortunately, however, “human rights auditing has not yet reached its embryonic 
stage.”270 This helps account for the CSR movement’s failure to discover, problematize, 
and combat corporate complicity in gender discrimination in Saudi Arabia.  An 
enforceable reporting mechanism with precise and clearly defined principles upholding 
women’s fundamental rights, verifiable through an independent body would deter 
companies from engaging in flagrant human rights violations.  Moreover, bodies such as 
the Global Compact, Calvert Women’s Principles and the Global Sullivan Principles 
should revise their CSR codes to include greater detail and should phrase those principles 
as enforceable, binding statements rather than vague statements of promise.  
  The groups charged with defining and monitoring these rules should be comprised 
of individuals who will be sensitive both to gender discrimination issues as well as to 
cultural differences and local practices. Thus, we suggest incorporating NGOs from 
women’s rights groups in addition to NGOs that are experts on local cultural norms. The 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, for example, played a leading role in 
helping to put an end to apartheid in South Africa. Either it or a similar organization could 
help enforce non-derogable, universal human rights while paying special attention to ‘the 
margin of appreciation’ afforded each nation based on its distinctive culture.  
The rating given to corporations operating in Saudi Arabia would be based on 
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both the proactive and reactive forms of CSR we noted above. Thus, corporations would 
not only be prevented from condoning or enforcing gender discrimination, but would be 
motivated to take active measures to improve women’s rights, at least within their spheres 
of influence. For example, signatories would be rewarded with a higher ranking based on 
efforts such as human rights training and awareness programs, employment equity, 
strengthening civil society, formally protesting human rights abuses, and other efforts 
undertaken to reduce the impact of gender discrimination. 
The rankings generated would give the public a true and unbiased assessment of a 
company’s treatment of women in Saudi Arabia and would be available to consumers, 
shareholders, and socially responsible funds. Those firms achieving high scores would be 
celebrated justifiably for being CSR heroes (such as Dunkin Donuts), while those 
complicit in gender discrimination would be exposed. Those MNCs who claim to uphold 
gender equality and prohibit discrimination, but refuse to sign the codes would generate 
suspicion over their failure to sign. Those who did sign, on the other hand, would enhance 
their legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the public.271 
This market-driven system would be reminiscent of that which existed under the 
Sullivan Principles in South Africa during the days of apartheid. In that case, Leon 
Sullivan devised a set of seven concrete and verifiable principles that required U.S. 
companies to adhere to universal human rights standards, despite (or as a result of) their 
operating in an oppressive local environment.272 Sullivan made sure that he had “a 
consistent monitoring system, understandable both to the companies themselves and to the 
anti-apartheid movement.” To ensure compliance and prevent the regulatory issues 
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associated with unenforceable CSR codes, Sullivan hired an independent auditing firm, 
Arthur D. Little, to monitor signatories. Each firm was then given a regular rating on “a 
scale of I (‘making good progress’), II (‘making progress’), or III (‘needs to become more 
active’).”273 Those who received a ‘I’ or a ‘II’ would pass. The rest would fail.274  
A question normally raised with creating third-party enforcement mechanisms is 
how to generate funds. Yet, Sullivan was able to pay for these monitoring services from 
fees paid by the signatories themselves.275 In fact, being a part of the Sullivan Principles 
become so popular that although only twelve MNCs signed on initially, within just a few 
years “173 of the 300 firms doing business in South Africa had committed.”276  
Four years after the Principles’ inception, “the number of black South Africans 
who held technical positions with American companies jumped from a token few to over 
10,000,”277 and “Sullivan signatories contributed nearly $300 million to public works (like 
improving African schools).”278 Comparing the original Sullivan Principles to a code such 
as the Calvert Women’s Principles provides a prime example of how a monitored code, as 
opposed to a purely self-regulating one, can better promote corporate respect for non-
derogable rights. 
A look at the Sullivan Principles also provides a good template with respect to 
what an anti-gender discrimination code for U.S. companies operating in Saudi Arabia 
could look like. By substituting the word ‘race’ with ‘sex’ and ‘blacks’ with ‘women’, the 
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Sullivan Principles read: 
1. Non-segregation of [the sexes] in all eating, comfort, and work 
facilities. 
2. Equal and fair employment practices for all employees. 
3. Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the 
same period of time. 
4. Initiation of and development of training programs that will prepare, 
in substantial numbers, [women] for supervisory, administrative, 
clerical, and technical jobs. 
5. Increasing the number of [women] in management and supervisory 
positions. 
6. Improving the quality of life for [women] outside the work 
environment in such areas as housing, transportation, school, 
recreation, and health facilities. 
7. Working to eliminate laws and customs that impede social, 
economic, and political justice. 
 
It would be surprising if the CSR ‘paragons’ used in this study would fail to 
adhere to, or at a minimum sign on to, such a code if it were implemented in 
Saudi Arabia and used by the CSR movement in its corporate evaluations. Given 
the large sums that MNC’s spend on branding, these companies’ cost/benefit 
analysis would change if prohibiting women from having equal treatment in their 
facilities would cause them to lose their spots on the 2010 ‘Best Corporations 
List’. 
It is possible, however, that the threat of consumer or shareholder activism would 
not suffice to ensure that companies respect women’s rights. In fact, even though the 
Sullivan Principles are widely considered to be an essential component of the anti-
apartheid struggle, Sullivan himself later abandoned this voluntary approach in favor of 
more stringent measures.279 Given the fact that this case in particular has fallen beneath 
the CSR radar, we believe that monitored CSR should be a first, but not a final step in 
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enforcing MNC compliance with universal human rights in Saudi Arabia. Rather, as 
Robert Reich suggests, an enforceable legal standard created through national legislation 
is perhaps the most promising and enduring way to ensure that corporations operating 
abroad treat women with the same dignity they purport to treat them with at home.280 
 
Enforceable Legal Standards 
CSR is expected to play its most important role where governments are either 
unwilling or unable to uphold human rights. If CSR codes have failed to govern these 
areas adequately, the most obvious solution is simply to fill the governance gaps created 
by globalization with enforceable laws. In other words, reverting to direct, state-based 
governance in those areas currently devoid of regulation. Government action would 
provide the largest change in a corporation’s ‘payoff structure’ and would enforce respect 
for fundamental human rights in a way that voluntary measures could not. Although this is 
also the hardest standard to achieve from a political and jurisprudential standpoint, the 
U.S. has already shown its willingness to extend its jurisdiction beyond its national 
boundaries. 
Congress has enacted several pieces of legislation to hold actors operating abroad 
accountable for human rights violations. Of particular relevance for our purposes are the 
Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 (ATCA),281 the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
(FCPA)282 and the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA).283 These 
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measures granted long-arm jurisdiction to American courts in order to regulate activities 
that were seen as against the ‘law of nations’. 
ATCA reads, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”284 Several lower courts have interpreted the ‘law of nations’ clause 
broadly and have granted causes of action against corporations operating internationally 
for a wide array of human rights abuses.285 The notion that “[c]ourts must interpret 
international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations 
of the world today” was central to these courts’ rulings.286 In defining modern 
international law, these courts considered “international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states [and] 
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”287 Some courts 
have even gone so far as to recognize international corporate codes of conduct such as 
those enumerated by the ILO.288 
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, however, the Supreme Court severely narrowed 
ATCA’s scope ruling that only a “modest number of international law violations” defined 
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with the specificity of “18th-century paradigms” would be actionable.289 The only 
violations that the Court decided met this level of specificity today were “torture, 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, summary execution, arbitrary detention 
and disappearance.”290 The Court refused to grant a cause of action for other human rights 
violations, stating, “we are reluctant to infer intent to provide a private cause of action 
where the statute does not supply one expressly” and that “the decision to create a private 
right of action is one better left to legislative judgment.”291 Thus, without a clear 
“congressional mandate,” the Court would refuse “to seek out and define new and 
debatable violations of the law of nations.”292 In Justice Scalia’s view, this ruling was 
“sufficient to close the door to further independent judicial recognition of actionable 
international norms.”293  
The Court’s decision to enforce only a very narrow range of international human 
rights violations highlights the need for legislative action geared towards enforcing 
corporate compliance with modern conceptions of non-derogable rights, in this case, 
gender equality. The Court did not state that such rights fell below the standard of 
international customary law, but rather that they would refrain from ruling on a myriad of 
human rights violations until granted an express congressional mandate to do so. 
Therefore, were Congress to interpret the ‘law of nations’ clause to include gender 
equality, ATCA could provide a jurisdictional basis for preventing U.S. corporations from 
engaging in gender discrimination.  
                                                 
289 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724, 725 (U.S. 2004) 
290 Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, The Alien Tort Statute, 
and Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (2007).   
291 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 727. 
292 Id. at 728. 
293Id. at 729. 
 73
Congress has previously provided the judiciary with an express mandate for long-
arm jurisdiction when it felt the national interest to be at stake. The FCPA, for example, 
demonstrates how targeted and robust national legislation can fill in the governance gaps 
created by globalization while still enabling MNCs to operate abroad. The Act 
criminalized foreign bribery and curtailed the corrupt business practices of over 400 U.S. 
corporations.294 The central reasons offered for the FCPA mirror directly the concerns the 
United States should have in allowing gender discrimination to go unchecked.  
The legislative history of the Act states that bribery “is counter to the moral 
expectations and values of the American public”295 and that corporate corruption had led 
“the image of American democracy abroad [to have been] tarnished.”296 Specifically, the 
House maintained: 
Corporate bribery also creates severe foreign policy problems for the 
United States. The revelation of improper payments invariably tends 
to embarrass friendly governments, lower the esteem for the United 
States among the citizens of foreign nations, and lend credence to the 
suspicions sown by foreign opponents of the United States that 
American enterprises exert a corrupting influence.297  
 
In response to claims that engaging in foreign bribery was a necessary part of doing 
business in certain countries, the Senate stated, “[m]any U.S. firms have taken a strong 
stand against paying foreign bribes and are still able to compete in international trade. 
Unfortunately, the reputation and image of all U.S. businessmen has been tarnished by the 
activities of a sizable number.”298 Additionally, the legislature stated, “not only is 
[bribery] unethical, it is bad business as well” since it “casts a shadow on all U.S. 
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companies. The exposure of such activity can damage a company's image”299 and “reveal 
a lack of confidence about themselves.”300 Accordingly, the Senate argued that, “[a] 
strong antibribery law is urgently needed to bring these corrupt practices to a halt and to 
restore public confidence in the integrity of the American business system.”301 
“[M]ost of the significant trading countries in the world” later followed 
Washington’s lead and ratified the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which was based directly 
on the FCPA.302 The Convention expanded the FCPA’s jurisdiction to “include all foreign 
persons who commit an act in furtherance of a foreign bribe while in the United States.”303 
The United States codified the Convention in the International Bribery Act of 1998. The 
Act stated: 
This exercise of jurisdiction over U.S. businesses and nationals for 
unlawful conduct abroad is consistent with U.S. legal and constitutional 
principles and is essential to protect U.S. interests abroad. It is within the 
constitutional grant of power to Congress to "regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations’ and to ‘define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of 
Nations.’ U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 & 10.304 
Thus, in this case, the United States legislature provided an express cause of action based 
on the ‘law of nations’, which it interpreted to include bribery. Similarly, for many of the 
same reasons outlined above,305 we suggest that Congress once again clarify its 
interpretation of ‘the law of nations’ to include prohibiting gender discrimination by U.S. 
corporations. 
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 Such an act could resemble the anti-discriminatory legislation passed in response 
to South African apartheid. Notwithstanding Ronald Reagan’s veto, the CAAA “set forth 
a comprehensive and complete framework to guide the efforts of the United States in 
helping to bring an end to apartheid in South Africa and lead to the establishment of a 
nonracial, democratic form of government.”306 Sections 207 and 208 of the Act provide a 
template of the sort of regulation we envision. These sections state: 
Sec. 207. (a) Any national of the United States that employs more 
than 25 persons in South Africa shall take the necessary steps to 
insure that the Code of Conduct is implemented. . . .  
Sec. 208. (a) The Code of Conduct referred to . . . is as follows: 
(1) desegregating the races in all employment [eating and comfort] facilities;307 
(2) providing equal employment opportunity for all employees 
without regard to race or ethnic origin; 
(5) increasing by appropriate means the number of persons in 
managerial, supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical 
jobs who are disadvantaged by the apartheid system for the 
purpose of significantly increasing their representation in such 
jobs; 
(6) taking reasonable steps to improve the quality of employees' 
lives outside the work environment with respect to housing, 
transportation, schooling, recreation, and health; and 
(7) implementing fair labor practices by recognizing the right 
of all employees, regardless of racial or other distinctions, to 
self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations, 
freely and without penalty or reprisal, and recognizing the right 
to refrain from any such activity. 
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that in addition to the principles 
enumerated in subsection (a), nationals of the United States subject 
to section 207 should seek to comply with the following principle: 
taking reasonable measures to extend the scope of influence on 
activities outside the workplace, including 
(1) supporting the unrestricted rights of black businesses to 
locate in urban areas; 
(2) influencing other companies in South Africa to follow the 
standards of equal rights principles; 
(3) supporting the freedom of mobility of black workers to 
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seek employment opportunities wherever they exist, and make 
provisions for adequate housing for families of employees within 
the proximity of workers' employment; and 
(4) supporting the rescission of all apartheid laws.308 
 
Applying these corporate standards to gender discrimination in Saudi Arabia would 
almost certainly reduce MNC complicity in human rights abuses. For the purposes of this 
paper, we coin our proposed bill the Anti-Gender-Discrimination Act (AGDA). In 
addition to substituting ‘gender’ for ‘race’ and ‘Saudi Arabia’ for ‘South Africa’, AGDA 
would include some important distinctions from the CAAA. First, while the CAAA 
provided for sanctions against the South African regime itself, AGDA would be far 
narrower and apply only to the actual discriminatory practices of multinationals. Second, 
while the CAAA prohibited all new investment in South Africa, AGDA would still 
permit new investments in oppressive regimes, however, only when done within the 
boundaries of international human rights law. Thus, AGDA’s scope resembles that of the 
FCPA and ATCA, while its anti-discriminatory provisions echo those of the CAAA.  
It is important to note that Section 208 of the CAAA is divided into two parts, 
with Subsection (a) issuing strict standards and regulations that MNCs are prohibited 
from breaching and Subsection (b) suggesting certain proactive measures that 
corporations are encouraged to take. This divide resembles that between ‘proactive’ and 
‘reactive’ CSR.309 Based on this template, AGDA would prohibit MNCs from 
discriminating directly while also suggesting some proactive measures corporations could 
take to improve their surroundings. The reactive measures would constitute the 
enforceable legal standards regulated by the government, while the proactive measures 
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could be used by the CSR community in its corporate evaluations. 
Unlike the FCPA, which provides for criminal penalties, we suggest that AGDA 
give a private cause of action to women who have been discriminated against in a foreign 
country by a company with minimum contacts in the United States. The cause of action 
should allow for punitive damages sufficient to counterbalance any financial gains earned 
through enforcing discrimination. Insofar as MNCs continue to support discrimination for 
monetary purposes, this would change the payoff structure so that the costs of violating 
equal rights principles outweigh the benefits to be gained from enforcing discriminatory 
practices. Thus, the amount of damages awarded should take into account the numbers of 
foreign women precluded from bringing suit in the United States. To “level the playing 
field” for American and foreign MNCs, the act should adopt the language of the 
International Anti-Bribery Act and “assert territorial jurisdiction broadly . . . to include all 
foreign persons who commit an act in furtherance of [gender discrimination] while in the 
United States.”310 Such a measure would strongly dissuade MNCs with significant 
operations in the U.S. from instituting discriminatory practices.  
 Like bribery and racial apartheid, gender discrimination “is counter to the moral 
expectations and values of the American public.”311 American people have long accepted 
the principle that separate is “inherently unequal”312 and to allow American corporations 
to institute discriminatory policies goes directly against the harsh lessons this nation has 
learned over the course of its history. The United States cannot stand as a beacon of the 
principle of human dignity and freedom if it allows its own corporations to engage in 
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egregious human rights violations on the international stage.  
Our case study shows that the discriminatory policies of these MNCs affect both 
American citizens and foreign nationals. Failure to check U.S. complicity in gender 
discrimination casts a shadow over the U.S.’s lofty proclamations of gender equality and 
compromises its leadership in promoting international human rights policy. Conversely, 
upholding fundamental human rights could help the United States regain some of the 
diplomatic capital it has lost in recent times and reestablish itself as a human rights 
leader. AGDA could eventually encourage the rest of the international community to 
adopt binding legislation upholding women’s rights as the FCPA did with the OECD 
convention against bribery.313 
As established previously, cultural relativism does not provide an adequate 
justification for violating non-derogable human rights. Although several scholars are 
weary of enforcing Western values abroad, women’s equality is neither a Western 
concoction nor a tool of American hegemonic predation.314 It is a fundamental human 
right guaranteed to all people regardless of nationality, which the Saudis themselves have 
adopted, albeit only in principle.  
The example of Dunkin Donuts shows that American corporations can still be 
respectful of local culture without enforcing gender discrimination. There is nothing in 
Islam that suggests that women be confined to sub-standard facilities.315 In fact, Muslim 
human rights activists have harshly criticized Western reluctance to promote their interests 
because of a presumed notion in the West that suggests Muslims cannot be feminists; a 
                                                 
313 See discussion supra pp. 73-74. 
314 Marina Ottaway, for example, argues against imposing Western values in Saudi 
Arabia. See Richard Abdy, supra note 78 (quoting Marina Ottaway). 
315 Mayer, A ‘Benign’ Apartheid, note 113, at 269-270. 
 79
presumption which is both insulting and unjust to the myriad of Muslim human rights 
activists around the world. Responding to scholars advocating restraint in promoting 
women’s rights in Muslim countries, a group of feminist leaders from eighteen Muslim 
countries noted, “they (i.e. the cultural relativists) react much like fundamentalists do: 
they worry about our legitimacy, doubt our analysis, question our premises and challenge 
our conclusions. We are presumed to be ‘westernized’ and not authentic enough, we are 
not really ‘Muslim’.”316 Needless to say, such a mentality risks leaving human rights 
activists operating in restrictive societies alone and without recourse to remedy. 
Moreover, AGDA does not necessarily prevent those elements of society that 
prefer to live under segregated conditions from doing so. Those individuals are free to 
choose whether or not they would prefer to patron an establishment that afforded women 
equal treatment. Thus, AGDA actually leads to ‘pareto efficient freedom’, if we can call it 
such, since nobody’s freedom is impaired while overall freedom is increased. Such a 
system stands in stark contrast to the prevailing policy that actively prohibits women from 
using certain facilities.  
As in the debates surrounding the FCPA, some might suggest that a policy such as 
AGDA would compromise Washington’s sensitive diplomatic relations in the region. 
Such arguments were at the heart of Reagan’s veto to the CAAA and may explain why the 
Bush administration has refrained from making gender discrimination an issue of national 
concern.317 AGDA, however, is very narrowly tailored and would not infringe on Saudi 
sovereignty. It does not impose human rights values directly on the Saudi Arabian 
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government. It merely prohibits corporations with significant ties to the United States 
from engaging in gender discrimination themselves. Thus, notwithstanding whatever other 
social conditions exist in Saudi Arabia—or any other oppressive regime for that matter— 
we can at least ensure that MNCs themselves will abide by universal human rights 
principles.  
Additionally, while we certainly recognize that the Saudi regime’s friendly 
relations with Washington are important in a region where good friends are both hard to 
find and necessary, we maintain that having a strong diplomatic relationship does not 
entail condoning human rights violations. The United States can still keep Saudi Arabia as 
an ally while prohibiting its corporations from enforcing gender discrimination. Thus, we 
adopt the position of the District Court in the Southern District of New York, which 
refused to dismiss an ATCA claim holding: 
[There is no] logical argument as to why the mere existence of certain 
U.S. diplomatic overtures . . . should prevent this case from proceeding. 
Indeed, as the world's foremost superpower, the United States has 
complex diplomatic relationships with virtually every country. This fact, 
without more, does not militate in favor of dismissal.”318  
 
This is particularly true in this case since many of the practices adopted by MNCs in 
Saudi Arabia are not illegal according to Saudi law, but rather adhere to custom alone.319  
In fact, promoting women’s equality may actually lead to even better long-term 
diplomatic relations both with the Kingdom and throughout the broader Middle East. 
Extremist religious groups are generally the most fervent proponents of gender 
discrimination and are also the most opposed to having friendly relations with 
Washington. Tom Lantos suggests that promoting gender equality “will tilt the balance in 
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favor of tolerant policies . . . thereby weakening extremist influences in the country. 
[Moreover] [w]ith Saudi Arabia’s significant religious and economic influence regionally 
and globally, empowering women in Saudi Arabia will radically increase chances for 
democratic reforms in other Arab and Muslim societies worldwide.”320 In other words, 
promoting the equal treatment of women in the Kingdom would likely create ripple 
effects that could serve to reduce extremist influences and improve U.S. relations in the 
region.  
 Critics might also object to AGDA based on economic grounds. As Milton 
Friedman’s famous critique of CSR stated, “there is one and only one social 
responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits.”321 We suggest, however, that even adopting a purely profit 
maximizing approach points in favor promoting women’s equality. In her seminal work, 
the Economics of Gender, Joyce Jacobsen finds that enforcing gender segregation can 
severely retard economic growth.322 Specifically, Jacobsen suggests that a few MNCs 
operating in oppressive societies may enjoy some short-term benefits by enforcing 
discriminatory practices, however, will sacrifice more sustainable, long-term gains in the 
process.323 The reasoning behind this theory is clear: “women’s inclusion in political and 
civic life would unleash a wealth of talent that could increase domestic economic activity, 
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empower competition, reduce unnecessary costs of social segregation, enrich cultural and 
civic development, and help foster democratic institutions,” all of which promote 
economic productivity.324  
 A final critique against AGDA could be that it does not go far enough in 
preventing gender discrimination. Such criticisms were often lodged against those 
corporations that continued operating in South Africa even though abiding by the 
Sullivan Principles. These voices urged that the only way to bring an end to severe 
discrimination was through more radical policies such as complete divestment or 
sanctions. In fact, such arguments suggested that allowing corporations to continue 
operations in repressive regimes would lend legitimacy to those regimes and lessen 
pressures for more sweeping reforms.325  
Although sanctions were eventually required against South Africa, the impact of 
corporations refusing to enforce apartheid “contributed more to the anti-apartheid 
struggle than activists acknowledged at the time.” By continuing to maintain operations 
in repressive regimes, but refusing to adopt repressive policies, MNCs can serve a norm 
generating function that can create substantive effects throughout other social and 
political fora. Thus, in the words of Sullivan himself, by upholding fundamental human 
rights while operating within oppressive societies MNCs can become “agents of 
change.”326 Moreover, a harsher stance would likely lead to a realization of the above-
mentioned critiques such as infringing upon Saudi sovereignty, complicating diplomatic 
ties and lowering overall economic development. Thus, regulating corporate behavior 
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while still allowing MNCs to operate is the least invasive and confrontational method of 
engendering critical human rights reforms. 
 
Conclusion 
We have found CSR to leave behind significant gaps in global governance 
and allow for certain human rights abuses to continue unchecked.  It is not our 
position that CSR fails to serve a purpose. First, it gives us an important point of 
reference for being able to judge corporate activities. In fact, it is only because the 
firms selected for this study promised to adhere to some standard of behavior that we 
can accuse them of falling short of their obligations. Furthermore, corporations do 
act responsibly in many situations. We certainly prefer living in a world where firms 
protect children, recycle, purchase fair trade coffee, build hospitals, have decent 
working conditions and engage in the myriad of other causes for which CSR is best 
known. Notwithstanding these benefits, there are still severe human rights violations 
occurring in the international arena, which are not being regulated.  
We refrain from issuing sweeping policy recommendations and do not 
advocate for a complete reversion to state-based governance as many activists do. 
Rather, we suggest only that issues constituting grave human rights violations for 
which CSR has failed to provide a remedy be regulated by more robust mechanisms 
such as monitored codes or enforceable legislation. Such remedies are more likely to 
secure respect for fundamental human rights as opposed to relying solely on an 
MNC’s goodwill or voluntary CSR commitments, which, as we have seen, do not 
suffice to hold corporate actors accountable. CSR should still continue as a means 
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for firms to go above and beyond their basic duties. CSR should not, however, 
desensitize either the public or the state from scrutinizing closely corporate activities 
that may very well be violating not only a corporation’s own CSR codes, but 
fundamental human rights.  
